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Maranville: Workplace Mythologies and Unemployment Insurance: Exit, Voice and

WORKPLACE MYTHOLOGIES AND
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: EXIT, VOICE AND
EXHAUSTING ALL REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES
TO QUITTING
DeborahMaranville*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Joan and Myna, two sisters, worked as housekeepers on board a
fish-processing vessel for a year and a half On their last voyage, their
supervisor, the chief steward, Mark, yelled at them at leastfour times a
day, in sessions lasting at least ten minutes, both while they were on and
off duty, and often in front of co-workers. He referred to women
generally as "bitches" and "Pavlov's dogs." As a result of this
behavior, Joan began taking medication for stress-relatedsymptoms. In
their initial orientation,Mark, the chief steward, warned Joan and Myna
not to discuss anything with the ship captain. This warning was
reinforced by the factory managers and engineers, who said the captain
would just refer complaints back to Mark, and his conduct would
become worse. Another crew member's complaint had been handled in
just that way. Before their last voyage, Joan and Myna had talked to the
human resources manager, who said there was little he could do about
the situation. They did not file a formal complaint, because they were
afraid they would lose theirjobs if they did, and they were aware that a
co-employee hadfiled a grievance that had gone nowhere.
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Ten years ago, a student in my law school clinic represented Joan
and Myna after they quit their jobs and each was denied unemployment
benefits, because "you did not make every effort to resolve the problem
or preserve your job."' After a hearing, an administrative law judge
again denied their claims for unemployment benefits, describing the case
as a "close case, and one upon which reasonable minds might disagree."'
She was
bothered by the lack of any reasonable effort ... to rectify the situation
prior to resigning. Although it is understandable that a ship captain
may be intimidating and should be used only as a last resort, as ship
captain, the situation . .. was serious enough to warrant such
intervention .... Additionally, . . . a reasonable and prudent person
under the same or similar circumstances would have gone to the
human resource office rather than waiting until after the resignation.3
The judge's decision was subsequently reversed on the ground that
"any remedial measures claimants might have taken beyond those they
did take would have been futile."
This Article had its genesis in my "rant" over the administrative
law judge's decision in this case and similar decisions over the
intervening ten years, and in my attempt to articulate why I did not think
this case was a close one, and why the requirement that workers exhaust
alternatives to quitting strikes me as misguided. Before proceeding with
that effort, however, a bit of background is in order. In our law school
Unemployment Compensation Clinic, one of the common case
categories that we encounter is the "voluntary quit" case. In my state,
like many others, an individual can receive unemployment benefits
despite having voluntarily left her work, if she can show that she had
"good cause" for quitting. In addition, however, she must show that she
first "exhausted all reasonable alternatives prior to termination."5
As is often the case with legal standards, at first blush, this
exhaustion requirement seems both simple and reasonable. The
unemployment system is often described as a system designed to
provide benefits to individuals who are "unemployed through no fault of

1. In re Barnett, Wash. Office of Admin. Hearings No. 2-04445, Rev. No. 9-21200 (Wash.
Employment Sec. Dep't 1992); In re Nissen, Wash. Office of Admin. Hearings No. 2-05202, Rev.
No. 9-21201 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1992).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-16-009(1)(c) (1977).
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their own."6 If an individual quits work due either to problems in the
workplace, or to medical or personal problems that could arguably be
resolved or accommodated by the employer, but does not bring those
problems to the employer's attention, then surely the individual is
somehow "at fault" in causing the unemployment. In the following
pages, however, I argue that the exhaustion requirement is premised on
inaccurate assumptions about the world of work and the situation of
employees. Thus, it should be abandoned or severely limited in its
application.
This Article first traces the development of the voluntary quit
exhaustion requirement and its implementation in the case law (Part II)
and identifies common themes in the cases (Part III). I then draw on
Albert Hirschman's Exit, Voice, and Loyalty theoretical framework for
thinking about decisions to stay or leave in the economic and political
realms (Part IV). Using empirical research from the negotiations
literature, linguistics and a variety of other sources, I critique the
exhaustion requirement both on its face, and as applied in practice. I
argue that many workers understandably forego voice in favor of exit,
given their legitimate fear that they will be subject to retaliation if they
complain, the more serious consequences of being fired than quitting,
and the power disparities between the typical worker and the typical
employer. In addition, I suggest that the exhaustion requirement is
premised on a vision of employment as more like a political community
than an economic marketplace. While this vision may be an attractive
aspiration, it is one with little foundation in many twenty-first century
workplaces.

II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A.

The Big Picture

The Great Depression of the 1930s was the incubator of three major
"safety net" social welfare programs in the United States: Social
Security, Aid to Families with Children (the welfare as we know it that
ended under the Clinton administration) and Unemployment Insurance.
Unlike its fellows, and perhaps because its federal component is less
visible, the unemployment program has not been the subject of
intensive, highly visible national political attention and conflict in recent

6. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-601 (1995).
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decades. Smaller scale skirmishes have continued to take place on the
state level, however.
We have at least three reasons7 to believe that the low profile of the
unemployment insurance program may not continue. First,
unemployment benefits are ceasing to do the job for which they were
designed, as the percentage of the unemployed who receive benefits has
declined significantly over the last quarter of a century. Second, and
concomitantly, workers and the workplace have changed dramatically
since the unemployment insurance program was initiated. The workforce
is increasingly diverse, with both men and women, and workers of many
races and ethnicities performing most jobs. Fewer jobs are performed as
full-time, full-year, long-term work for traditional employers.9 Third, the
restructuring of welfare into the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families ("TANF"),"' with its imposition of time limits for receipt of
benefits, prompts increased attention to whether the unemployment
system responds to the lives of all workers.
Studies of the unemployment compensation system attribute the
decline in the "take-up rate" for unemployment, that is, the decline in the
portion of the workforce receiving benefits, to a combination of factors."
Among these, "numerous state laws were changed to restrict eligibility
7. In addition to the three issues cited in the text, the Clinton Administration adopted final
regulations in 2000 that authorized the states to experiment with using the unemployment system on
a limited basis as a vehicle for paid family leave. So far the states have not responded to this
invitation, but if the proposals do not die a quiet death, they can be expected to generate maximum
resistance. See 20 C.F.R. § 604.1 (2002); Loryn Lancaster & Anne Vogel, Changes in
Unemployment Insurance Legislation in 2001, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Jan. 2000, at 37.
8. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 35, fig. 4-2 (1994) [hereinafter ADVISORY COUNCIL]; Stephen A. Wandner &
Andrew Stettner, Why Are Many Jobless Workers Not Applying for Benefits?, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., June 2000, at 2 I.
9. In earlier articles I have looked at the ways in which the design of the unemployment
system systematically excludes from eligibility individuals who do not meet the profile of the ideal
worker, especially individuals who work part-time. See Deborah Maranville, Changing Economy,
Changing Lives: Unemployment Insurance and the Contingent Workforce, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
291, 293 (1995); Deborah Maranville, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive
Thought and Action: Feminist Theory and Legal Practice: A Case Study on Unemployment
Compensation Benefits and the Male Norm, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1081 (1992).
10. See Jim Moye & Roberta Rinker, It's a Hard Knock Life: Does the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997 Adequately Address Problems in the Child Welfare System?, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGis. 375, 387 (2002).
11. The President's Advisory Council cites broad demographic changes, such as an increase
in two-eamer households who might be less in need of benefits, increases in program coverage to
workers who might be less familiar with the availability of benefits, a decline in manufacturing and
other industries with high recipiency rates, a decline in unionization, and a population shift to states
with historically low recipiency rates (and presumably stricter eligibility rules). See ADVISORY
COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 37-43.
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and reduce benefit levels." 2 It seems likely that the decline of the union
movement has resulted in a changing balance of power in many states
that has had three effects: employers are more able to lobby successfully
for statutory changes that disadvantage employees; top level
administrative agency decision makers who approve agency regulations
are appointed by governors who are oriented more towards employers
than employees; and the players who grant or deny benefits-front-line
agency bureaucrats, hearing examiners, or administrative law judgeshave been influenced by the dominant individualistic cultural norms that
blame individuals for their problems at work.
In this Article, I propose to take a ground-level look at the way
these factors have converged and have led to the development and
extension of the voluntary quit exhaustion requirement, to critique the
resulting doctrinal developments, and then to consider the broader
implications of the current approach.
B. The Voluntary Quit Exhaustion Requirement
The unemployment compensation system in the United States
provides wage replacement benefits to unemployed workers. The system
is significantly decentralized as a result of the initial design of the
program. In 1934, Congress enacted the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act, that imposes a federal payroll tax with a credit to employers for
taxes paid under a state unemployment insurance system meeting
minimum federal standards.' 3 In response to this Act, by 1939 all states
had enacted unemployment programs,' 4 typically following the design of
either of two model acts'5 drafted by the Committee on Economic
Security. 6 The state programs continue to exhibit significant
commonalities, but the current versions diverge both as to statutory
details and implementation in regulations and case law. The timing of
the development of the voluntary quit exhaustion doctrine is consistent
with my speculation in the previous section that the decline in union

12. Id. at 39.
13. See 26 U.S.C. § 3302 (2002). In addition, the federal government provides grants to the
states for the administration of their unemployment compensation programs. To qualify for these
funds, the states must operate their programs in compliance with federal standards. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 501-502 (2002).
14. The early development of the state unemployment insurance programs is described in
Arthur Larson & Merrill G. Murray, The Development of Unemployment Insurance in the United
States, 8 VAND. L. REV. 181, 195 (1955).
15. See id. at 196.
16. See id. at 186.
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power has given employers increasing power to shape statutory and
other doctrinal developments in their favor.
At least eighteen states have adopted an exhaustion requirement in
some form. In eight states, the requirement is imposed by statute.'7 The
early statutory exhaustion requirements were limited to situations where
the individual quits for medical reasons and typically required that the
individual notify the employer of the reason for leaving as soon as
possible and offer to return to work when able. The first such
requirement appeared in a 1953 amendment to Arkansas's
unemployment insurance statute.'8 Similar provisions later appeared in
four states-Tennessee in 1967,'" Minnesota and Washington in 1977
and Kansas in 1982.20 In 1985, shortly after adding the medical quit
exhaustion requirements, Kansas extended the concept to quits due to
''personal emergency"; Minnesota added such a requirement for
"adverse working conditions [attributable to] the employer" in 1999,
having broadened the requirements imposed on the employee for
medical quits in 1998." More recently, three states have adopted
exhaustion provisions limited either to quits due to personal emergency2 2
or domestic violence. 23 Four western states impose an exhaustion
requirement by administrative regulation, all apparently adopted
between 1977 and 1986.24 During the decade from 1979 to 1989, three
17. See infra notes 18-23.
18. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-513 (Michie Supp. 2002) (effective 1952) (stating that the
original exhaustion requirement was limited to quitting for "illness, injury or disability" and the
current exhaustion provision also applies in cases of "personal emergency of such nature and
compelling urgency that it would be contrary to good conscience to impose a disqualification.").
19. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-7-303(a)(1) (Supp. 2001) (effective 1963) (providing where
claimant quits because "sick or disabled," not disqualified if "notified [his] employer of that fact as
soon as it was reasonably practical to do so, and returned to that employer and offered to work as
soon as [he] was again able to work, and to perform [his] former duties.").
20. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.095 subd. 1(7) (West Supp. 2002) (effective 1977)
(providing that an applicant who quit "because the applicant's serious illness or injury made it
medically necessary that the applicant quit, provided that the applicant made reasonable efforts to
remain in that employment" will not be disqualified from all unemployment benefits); WASH. REV.
CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b) (2002) (effective 1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-706(a)(1) (2001) (effective
1982).
21. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-706(a)(1 1) (2001) (effective 1982); MINN. STAT. § 268.095
subd. 3(b) (2002) (effective 1999) ("[T]he applicant must complain to the employer and give the
employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the adverse working conditions before that may be
considered a good reason caused by the employer for quitting.").
22. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-236(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2001) (effective 1999).
23. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1193(1)(A)(4) (West Supp. 2001) (effective 1991);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:32(l)(a)(3) (Supp. 1999) (effective 1998).
24. See ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE 6-3-50210 (2000) (effective 1977); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8,
§ 85.095 (1997) (effective 1980); HAW. ADMIN. CODE § 12-5-47 (1992) (effective 1981); OR.
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state supreme courts and two intermediate state appellate courts imposed
an exhaustion requirement through caselaw.!s Earlier, in 1970, the
Delaware Superior Court had imposed such a requirement. 26
The codified exhaustion requirements found in state statutes or
regulations are formulated in roughly four different ways, although it is
not clear that the variations in language have significant effect in
practice. Seven states focus on the reasonableness of what the claimant
did, requiring that the claimant must have made "reasonable efforts to
preserve his or her job rights,"27 and must "try reasonable alternatives
before terminating the employment relationship, 28 or "will not quit
impulsively" and "will attempt to maintain the employment except when
this is impossible or impractical., 29 Four additional states seem to focus
more on what the claimant could have done, requiring the claimant to
demonstrate that he/she had "no reasonable alternative but to leave
work"30 or he/she "exhausted all reasonable alternatives prior to
termination."'" In a statute limited to quits due to domestic violence,
§ 192-16-009(l)(c)
(2002) (filed September 2, 1977).
25. See infra notes 34-40.
26. See O'Neal's Bus Serv., Inc. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 269 A.2d 247, 249 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1970).
27. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-513(a)(3)(b) (Michie Supp. 2002) (providing that no individual
shall be disqualified if he quit due to a "personal emergency of such nature and compelling
urgency" or "illness, injury, pregnancy, or other disability"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31236(a)(2)(A)(ii) (West 2003) (providing that it applies to quits due to compelling personal
emergency only); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1193(l)(A)(1) & (4) (West Supp. 2001)
(providing that only quits due to illness or disability and domestic violence will be exempt from
disqualification); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.095 subd. 1(7) (West Supp. 2002) (providing that it
applies to medically necessary quits and the statute goes on to define "reasonable efforts" as "those
a reasonable individual would make if interested in remaining with the employer and these "require
that the applicant inform the employer of the serious illness or injury and request
accommodation.").
28. HAW. ADMIN. CODE § 12-5-47 (1992).
29. ARIz. ADMIN. CODE. § 6-3-50210(C)-(D) (2000) provides that:
C. A reasonable worker will not quit impulsively. He will attempt to maintain the
employment except when this is impossible or impractical. Good cause is generally not
established unless the worker takes one or more of the following steps prior to quitting in
an attempt to adjust the grievance:
1.Gives the work a fair trial.
2. Attempts to adjust unsatisfactory working conditions.
3. Requests a leave of absence when necessary to resolve some personal difficulty.
D. A worker need not take such steps before quitting if they are impracticable or
impossible, or would obviously not be fruitful.
30. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 85.095(c)(1) (2002) (effective Nov. 7, 1980); MD. CODE
ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-1001(c)(ii) (1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 657.176(12)(b)(C) (2001).
31. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-16-009(l)(c) (2002) (providing that Washington imposes a
voluntary quit "exhaustion" requirement in all cases); see WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
ADMIN. R. 471-030-0038(4) (2002) (effective 1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE
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New Hampshire requires that the "individual did all things a reasonably
prudent person would have done."32 Finally, two states have adopted
statutes that specifically require claimants who quit due to medical
problems to notify the employer of the problem and request
reemployment when able to return to work.33
The courts that have imposed exhaustion requirements in the
absence of express language in a statute or regulation use a variety of
phrasings, all similar to those found in statutes. Some courts require the
claimant to make "reasonable effort[s]" to inform his employer,34
"retain[] his employment,"3 or "resolve conflicts." 36 Others require the
worker to "do something akin to exhausting his administrative
remedies"37 or "exhaust all alternatives less drastic."38 A third approach
is to assure that the individual not act "prematurely and without any real
investigation into the conditions of her future employment"39 or has "no
alternative to leaving gainful employment. 4 °
The impetus for such requirements seems to vary. In two of the
states where an "exhaustion" requirement has been imposed judicially
despite the lack of such a requirement in the governing statute or agency
regulations (Vermont and Virginia), the court was following the lead of

§ 50.20.050(2)(b) (West 2001) (providing that it imposes such a disqualification of unemployment
benefits except in the case of quitting due to medical reasons).
32. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:32(1)(a)(3)(B)(ii) (Supp. 1999) ("[Tlhe individual did all
things that a reasonably prudent person would have done to continue the employer-employee
relationship or the possibility of reemployment during the period the individual was unable to work
due to the domestic abuse.").
33. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-7-303(a)(1) (Supp. 2001) (requiring that the claimant
"notified such claimant's employer of that fact as soon as it was reasonably practical to do so, and
returned to that employer and offered to work as soon as such claimant was again able to work, and
to perform such claimant's former duties"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.20.050(2)(b) (requiring
that the claimant "took all reasonable precautions, in accordance with any regulations that the
commissioner may prescribe, to protect his or her employment status by having promptly notified
the employer of the reason for the absence and by having promptly requested reemployment when
again able to assume employment"); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-150-055(1)(c) (effective July 26,
2002) (stating that the implementing regulations simply repeat the statutory language).
34. Garcia v. Dep't of Employment & Training, 488 A.2d 762, 766 (Vt. 1985).
35. Lee v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 335 S.E.2d 104, 106 (Va. Ct. App. 1985).
App. Ct. 1984); White v. Sec. Link, 658
36. Davis v. Bd. of Review, 465 N.E.2d 576, 580 (Ill.
A.2d 619, 624 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994).
37. O'Neal's Bus Serv., Inc. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 269 A.2d 247, 249 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1970).
App. Ct. 1987); see also Steffen v. Davison,
38. Barron v. Ward, 517 N.E.2d 591, 594 (111.
Copple, Copple & Copple, 814 P.2d 29, 32 (Idaho 1991).
39. Fong v. Jerome Sch. Dist. No. 261,611 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Idaho 1979).
40. Molenda v. Thomsen, 772 P.2d 1303, 1304 (N.M. 1989).
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the agency administering the program." In Idaho, Illinois, and New
Mexico, on the other hand, the appellate decisions make no reference to
42
agency practice.
The exhaustion requirement has the potential of creating a Catch-22
situation. In some states that impose an exhaustion requirement, the
courts have also developed a requirement that an individual who waits
too long to quit in response to a change in working conditions, no longer
has good cause. 4 ' The Illinois appellate courts have cited this
requirement as a reason to find one complaint to the employer"
sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.
III.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN ACTION

Before attempting to evaluate whether, or in what circumstances, an
unemployment insurance voluntary quit exhaustion requirement makes
sense, it will be helpful to look at how such requirements are applied in
practice. Thus, in the following section, I will attempt to identify typical
factual circumstances that give rise to disputes over the requirement,
looking at three sources of information: the appellate case law, available
and, more impressionistically, the way
trial court decisions,
administrative agency decision makers apply the requirements.
A.

The Appellate Cases

As is the case with many issues that primarily affect low and
moderate income individuals, unemployment compensation claims do
not generate large numbers of appellate court cases. Though
unemployment benefits can be critical for getting individuals through a
difficult time, the limited amount of money at stake in each case makes
filing an appeal financially impractical for most employers as well as
employees. In addition, representing claimants in unemployment
compensation cases has often been a relatively low priority even in legal
services practices, so representation is not readily available and few
practitioners specialize in the issues. Nonetheless, such cases do
occasionally get appealed, in part because some states provide for
41. See Garcia v. Dep't of Employment & Training, 488 A.2d 762, 764 (Vt. 1985); Lee v.
Virginia Employment Comm'n, 335 S.E.2d 104, 106 (Va. Ct. App. 1985).
42. See Steffen, 814 P.2d at 32; Barron, 517 N.E.2d at 594; Molenda, 772 P.2d at 1304.
43. See, e.g., Jones v. Bd.of Review, 482 N.E.2d 1131, 1133 (111. App. Ct. 1985).
44. See, e.g., id. at 1133; Davis v. Bd. of Review, 465 N.E.2d 576, 581 (Il. App. Ct. 1984).
45. In four states-Connecticut,. Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania-published trial
court decisions are available. In addition, I have handled a small number of cases appealed to the
Washington Superior Courts that involved voluntary quit exhaustion cases.
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payment of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party out of the
unemployment compensation fund 6
The forty appellate cases47 that I have located are not necessarily
representative of the cases that provide the day-to-day grist for
administrative hearings. Keeping in mind that limitation, it may
nonetheless be useful to identify patterns in the cases that do proceed to
appeal. In about 70% of the appellate cases (twenty-eight), the claimant
quit due to a problem with the working conditions on the job.4' A quarter
of the cases involve claimants who quit due to their own, or a family
member's medical problems.4 ' The remaining cases each involve a
claimant who quit to preserve his marriage when his wife insisted on
moving back to her hometown. °
1. The "Working Conditions" Cases
Four subcategories of cases account for all the successful "working
conditions" claimants. The court held that the claimant satisfied the
exhaustion requirement in all the cases involving: (1) illegal activity,
other than sexual harassment on the part of the employer;' (2) the
employer changing the type or hours of work;5 2 or (3) the employer
issuing No Such Funds ("NSF") paychecks. 3 In all of these cases, the
employer was aware of the problem leading the employee to quit,
46. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.32.160 (West 2001).
47. In identifying cases, I have attempted to exclude cases that refer to an exhaustion
requirement, but do not discuss the application of the requirement to the facts of the case.
48. See tbl. 1, infra text accompanying notes 51-66.
49. See tbl.2, infra text accompanying notes 67-71.
50. The reports included two of these cases. In both, the claimant was granted benefits. See
Churchill Truck Lines, Inc. v. Dep't of Human Res., 837 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992);
Alston v. Employment Div., 676 P.2d 940, 940-41 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
51. See Garcia v. Dep't of Employment & Training, 488 A.2d 762, 763 (Vt. 1985) (involving
an employee who quit after unsuccessfully attempting to blow the whistle on police chief who asked
him to assist with theft); Umbarger v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 404 S.E.2d 380, 384 (Va. Ct.
App. 1991) (concerning an employee who quit after identifying sex discrimination in pay); Martini
v. State, 990 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (involving an employee who quit for financial
reasons after repeatedly contesting company's new requirement to pay for mandatory pager, and at
hearing alleged Minimum Wage Act violations); Robinson v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 930 P.2d
926, 927 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (concerning an employee who quit after meeting with employer
and its attorney, because employer was not properly licensed and she feared both loss of her license
as escrow agent, and personal liability for processing loans).
52. See Davis v. Bd. of Review, 465 N.E.2d 576, 578 (I11.App. Ct. 1984) (involving an
employee who quit after job changed from working with three- to five-year-old preschoolers to
working with emotionally disturbed teens and unsuccessfully raised concerns with employer); In re
Grier, 715 P.2d 534, 535 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (concerning a full-time job that was converted to
two part-time jobs, the employer "would understand" if employee needed to quit).
53. See Cavitt v. Employment Div., 803 P.2d 778, 779 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (involving an
employee's paycheck that was returned for insufficient funds on two occasions).
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because the employee raised the concern with a supervisor,54 though the
employee did not necessarily give a "change your policy or I'll quit"
ultimatum.
In a fourth subcategory of cases, the results were mixed: in four of
eight cases involving handling of sexual or racial harassment allegations,
the court held that the claimant had exhausted alternatives to quitting,
and in a fifth case, the court remanded for consideration of whether the
individual's behavior was "reasonable."55 In each of the successful
claims, the employee brought the problem to the attention of a
supervisor, though in two of the cases the employee then promptly quit.
The eighteen "working conditions" cases in which the court found
that the claimant failed to satisfy the exhaustion requirement involve a
mix of reasons given for quitting, including harassment by co-workers
(both sexual and non-sexual), 56 working conditions leading to job
stress,5 fear of losing the job, disputes over the employer's policies,
and the employer insulting the worker in some fashion.
54. In Martini, the employee repeatedly asked that the employer continue to pay for his pager,
but did not raise the Minimum Wage Act violations that provided good cause. 990 P.2d at 983.
App. Ct. 1987) (stating that, after co55. See Barron v. Ward, 517 N.E.2d 591, 593 (I11.
worker made racially derogatory comments about claimant, threatened to kill him and harassed him
in other ways, claimant was transferred out of department, then transferred back and told supervisor
he could not work with co-worker but was told he had no choice); Hunt v. Fairview Ridges Hosp.,
No. CO-90-2638, 1991 Minn. App. LEXIS 477, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. May 8, 1991) (unpublished
opinion) (concerning an employee who quit after investigation cleared him of sexual harassment
allegations, but employer failed to make that known and employee had requested transfer or paid
leave of absence and also presented evidence of stress by psychologist's report, so case could be
characterized as a medical quit); DiGiannantoni v. Wedgewater Animal Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d
1378, 1380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (involving an employee who raised allegations of sexual
harassment for the first time in request for reconsideration of denial of unemployment benefits and
the court remanded for consideration whether a "reasonable person" would have given notice to
employer in this instance); Sweitzer v. State, 718 P.2d 3, 5 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (concerning an
employee who spoke to supervisor and grievance committee and was told it would be useless to file
a grievance); Hussa v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 664 P.2d 1286, 1287 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983)
(involving an employee who experienced ongoing verbal and physical sexual harassment by coworkers, was threatened by employee who was suspended for his behavior, worked one more shift,
then quit and court held futility exception to exhaustion requirement applied in light of uncontested
harassment, threats, and unsympathetic comments by supervisor).
56. See Bowman v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 898 P.2d 492, 494 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)
(stating that, after consensual relationship ended, supervisor began retaliating and employee notified
night supervisor of problems and complained to owner and was offered transfers, but quit day after
meeting); Jensen v. Siemsen, 794 P.2d 271, 274 (Idaho 1990) (concerning an employee who quit
one day after reporting problems with doctor/supervisor); Larson v. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 281
N.W.2d 667, 668 (Minn. 1979) (detailing that, six weeks after starting job, employee reported
harassment by co-workers but harassment continued and claimant did not inform supervisors but
quit instead).
57. See Ipsen v. Akiba, 911 P.2d 116, 119 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that, after employee
was advised to seek other employment opportunities after takeover, employee injured ankle and
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In the three unsuccessful sexual harassment cases, the employee
either quit immediately after raising the issue with the employer, or
failed to raise the issue at all.61 In the three unsuccessful work-stress
cases, the court pointed to the following alternatives available to the
claimants: contacting an off-site general manager about an abusive
supervisor, seeking counseling or requesting a transfer, and filing
a
S 62
union grievance or waiting for a supervisor to return from vacation. In
two of the remaining
cases, the employee did not raise her concerns with
63
the employer. In the others the exhaustion requirement seems largely to
merge with the requirement that a claimant must show good cause for
quitting, either because the court views the employee as acting

supervisor called injury a scam so she resigned, calling supervisor insulting and abusive and court
held employee did not try reasonable alternatives to quitting when she did not speak to off-site
general manager); Noor v. Agsalud, 634 P.2d 1058, 1059 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981) (involving an
employee who left stressful job as psychological aide, but did not seek counseling or discuss other
options, such as transfer); Glennen v. Employment Div., 549 P.2d 1288, 1289 (Or. Ct. App. 1976)
(concerning a pregnant employee who was cautioned not to do heavy lifting, who was suspended
for two days and required to do more lifting while others in office were on vacation and she quit,
claiming physical and emotional stress, but did not file union grievance before she quit or wait until
her supervisor returned from vacation).
58. See Steffen v. Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, 814 P.2d 29, 30 (Idaho 1991)
(involving a probationary legal secretary who quit after another secretary was fired and she became
concerned about permanency of position and court held the record supported finding that she did not
exercise reasonable alternatives to quitting, but did not discuss reasoning).
59. See Fong v. Jerome Sch. Dist. No. 261, 611 P.2d 1004, 1005-06 (Idaho 1979) (concerning
a junior high school math teacher who failed 30% of students and quit after school district adopted
policy that failure rate above 7% must be justified, without waiting to learn what criteria might be
acceptable); Gibson v. Bd. of Review, 707 P.2d 675, 675-77 (Utah 1985) (involving an IRS
employee who developed stress-related symptoms due to concern that agency regulations singled
out lower- and middle-income taxpayers for audits and she quit without discussing with supervisor
or seeking transfer, because she no longer wished to work for the IRS); Johns v. Dep't of
Employment Sec., 686 P.2d 517, 518-19 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (concerning a clinical psychologist
who had philosophical differences with superiors, was dissatisfied with pay, and quit despite a
transfer).
60. See Rogers v. Trim House, 588 P.2d 945, 950 (Idaho 1979) (involving an employee who
quit because he thought his honesty was being questioned after he gave friend a bid on an
upholstering job that the employer thought was too low, but the court did not specify available
alternatives); see also Molenda v. Thomsen, 772 P.2d 1303, 1305 (N.M. 1989) (concerning an
employee legal secretary who quit after attorney-boss yelled at her, but did not discuss concerns
with him).
61. See Barron v. Ward, 517 N.E.2d 591, 593 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Hunt v. Fairview Ridges
Hosp., No. CO-90-2638, 1991 Minn. App. LEXIS 477, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. May 8, 1991)
(unpublished opinion); DiGiannantoni v. Wedgewater Animal Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 1378, 1380
(Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Sweitzer v. State, 718 P.2d 3, 5 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986); Hussa v.
Employment Sec. Dep't, 664 P.2d 1286, 1287 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
62. See Ipsen, 911 P.2d at 119; Noor, 634 P.2d at 1059; Glennen, 549 P.2d at 1289.
63. See Molenda, 772 P.2d at 1305 (concerning an employee legal secretary who quit after
attorney/boss yelled at her, but did not discuss concerns with him); Gibson, 707 P.2d at 677.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol31/iss2/5

12

Maranville: Workplace Mythologies and Unemployment Insurance: Exit, Voice and

20021

WORKPLACE MYTHOLOGIES

precipitously, before it is clear that good cause is present, 64 or because
65
the court views the employee as a malcontent.
TABLE 1:

QUITS DUE To WORKING CONDITIONS: APPELLATE COURT
# Remanded

4

# Benefits
Granted
4

0

# Benefits
Denied
0

2

2

0

0

1
6

1
3

0
1

0
2

1
4
1
3

0
1
0
0

0
0
0
0

1
3
1
3

2

0

0

0

2

0

0

2

Reason for Quitting

# Cases

Illegal behavior by
Employer
Changein
hours/type work
NSF paychecks
Sexual or racial
harassment
Other harassment
Stressful conditions
Fear of losing job
Disagreement over
policies
Employer insults
worker (yells,
questions honesty)
Other 66

2. The Medical Quit Cases
The cases in which claimants quit for medical reasons can be
grouped into four subcategories. The two cases in which the claimants
succeeded in obtaining unemployment benefits outright both involved a
dispute over whether the individual quit or was fired, 67 and, in my view,
64. See Steffen v. Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, 814 P.2d 29, 30 (Idaho 1991); Fong,
611 P.2d at 1006; Rogers, 588 P.2d at 950.
65. See Johns v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 686 P.2d 517, 519 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
66. See Lee v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 335 S.E.2d 104, 106 (Va. Ct. App. 1985)
(involving a claimant who quit after employer GSA failed to live up to grievance agreement); Korte
v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 734 P.2d 939, 941-42 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (concerning a claimant
who was given seventy-two hours to sign employment contract involving substantial changes,
including reduction in vacation time, reduction in hours, and no allowance for maternity leave).
67. See Moeller v. Minnesota Dep't of Transp., 281 N.W.2d 879, 882-83 (Minn. 1979)
(involving an alcoholic worker who voluntarily attempted treatment twice and, on second occasion,
called employer and was told employment was terminated and court treated as voluntary quit and
held that voluntarily entering rehabilitation on two occasions constituted reasonable efforts to retain
job); Am. Auto. Ass'n v. George, 1995 WL 389980 (1995) (unpublished opinion) (stating that,
during vacation visit to England, claimant's mother became ill, employer denied request for
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would more properly have been analyzed as firings.68 In a second set of
cases, the individual failed to provide timely documentation of the
medical problem, in addition to failing to convince the court that he
satisfied the exhaustion requirement.6 9 In the third subset of cases, the
workers quit while in the process of settling a worker's compensation
claim, and the court held that this action was premature.70 An additional
set of cases involves situations where a physician advised the individual
to quit, but the individual did not request a transfer.7'

additional leave and said failure to return would constitute voluntary quit and court briefly applied
both quit and discharge analyses and found claimant eligible under either standard).
68. In both cases, the employer initiated the job separation, and in neither case did the
employee desire to end the employment relationship. Under a firing analysis, the question would be
whether the employee's conduct constituted misconduct, a standard that might have been difficult
for employee to avoid in the Moeller case. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.095 subd. 6 (West Supp.
2002) (limiting the discharge disqualification to certain categories of intentional or negligent
conduct).
69. See generally McLafferty v. City of St. Paul Police, No. 63-92-1486, 1993 Minn. App.
LEXIS 79 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1993) (unpublished opinion) (involving an employee who
complained of harassment by supervisor, stress-related medical problems, and an arm injury;
chiropractor notified employer that employee needed to take two weeks off, but employee did not
make reasonable effort to retain employment because he did not respond to requests to provide
additional medical information and did not accept transfer to another department with
"insignificant" cut in pay); Tolbert v. Metal-Matic, Inc., No. C8-90-1818, 1990 Minn. App. LEXIS
1286 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1990) (unpublished opinion) (concerning an employee who quit on
advice of doctor but he did not provide medical records at hearing, though he did submit them with
request for reconsideration by Commissioner and court remanded for consideration of medical
evidence); Bajocich v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 739 P.2d 1155 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (stating
that, after several hearings, employee contended he quit for medical reasons, but did not provide
medical evidence and had not asked for a transfer or for permission to take breaks to accommodate
problem). See also Rahey v. Ecolab, Inc., No. C4-88-2433, 1989 Minn. App. LEXIS 543, at *3
(Minn. Ct. App. May 3, 1989) (unpublished opinion) (concerning an employee who claimed she
quit because she was discriminated against under policy allowing current employees first
opportunity to apply for vacant positions, and later added fear of losing job and resultant stress as
reasons and court held she made no reasonable effort to retain employment if she was having
medical problems, which seems to imply doubt that she had documented the claimed medical
problems).
70. See Young v. Employment Dep't, 13 P.3d 1027, 1030 (Or. Ct. App. 2000); Whitt v. Race
Fork Coal Corp., 441 S.E.2d 357 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
71. See Daves v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 502 S.W.2d 106, 107 (Ark. 1973) (concerning an
appliance sales representative who was advised by doctor to quit after two incidents of chest pain on
job and who resigned without requesting leave of absence or transfer); Kingery v. Adm'r, No. 1251,
1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 8563, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1986) (involving an assembly-line
worker who was advised to quit her job after she suffered cardiac condition aggravated by stress,
returned to work after two months, was unable to keep up, even after trading jobs with co-worker,
discussed problem with employer and applied for, but did not receive an office job and court denied
benefits on grounds that she did not request transfer).
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TABLE

2: QUITS FOR MEDICAL REASONS-APPELLATE COURT
# Remanded

2
3

# Benefits
Granted
2
0

0
1

# Benefits
Denied
0
2

2

0

0

2

2

0

0

2

Reason for Quitting

# Cases

Quit v. Discharge
Medical
documentation
Settling worker's
compensation
claim
Doctor's advice

B.

Trial Court Decisions

Twelve published trial court decisions involving the exhaustion
requirement are available from four states-Delaware, Connecticut,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.12 Of these, nine, or three-fourths, are
working conditions cases, and an additional four, or approximately oneeighth of the total, either involve both working conditions and medical
issues, or raise only medical quit issues. In four working conditions
cases, the employee quit due to a change in hours or type of work, and
was awarded benefits by the trial court.73 In three cases, the employee
alleged that the employer failed to pay wages in a timely fashion. In two
of these, the employee obtained benefits;" in the third, a case that also
involved claimed medical problems, the paycheck problems were due to
errors, not to employer financial problems and benefits were denied.75
72. I have not included in this number a line of cases from Pennsylvania involving labor
disputes. See, e.g., Glen Alden Coal Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 79 A.2d 796 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1951) (stating that, where employee had contract with employer for definite period and employer
breached by closing mine during two-week Memorial Period called by mineworkers' union,
employee was required to pursue remedies under contract, not claim unemployment benefits).
73. See White v. Sec. Link, 658 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994); Inside Radio/Radio
Only, Inc. v. Bd. of Review, 498 A.2d 791, 793 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1985) (stating that case also
involved medical problems resulting from long hours and stress); see also Mauro v. Unemployment
Comp. Bd., 751 A.2d 276, 279-80 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Fitzgerald v. Unemployment Comp.
Bd., 714 A.2d 1126, 1130 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998).
74. See Children's Health Care v. Adm'r, No. CV-990173792, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS
633, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 2000); Emgee Eng'g Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Review, 373 A.2d 779, 782-83 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
75. See generally Koman v. Commonwealth, 435 A.2d 277 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981)
(involving an employee who quit and alleged: (1) that she received two paychecks late, once due to
the office being closed for vacation, the other due to an error, (2) that she received two incorrect
paychecks that required correction, and (3) medical problems, but court denied her benefits on the
grounds that errors were promptly corrected, problems were not due to employer insolvency,
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Three additional cases involved miscellaneous disputes with the
employer; in one the claimant received benefits,76 while in the remaining
two, benefits were denied . Only one case involved a claim of sexual
harassment.78 The one medical quit case involved a worker who quit in
order to provide care for her father.79
TABLE 3:

VOLUNTARY QUIT CASES-TRIAL COURT

Reason for Quitting

# Cases

Working conditions
Changein
hours/type work

11
4

# Benefits
Granted
7
4

0
0

# Benefits
Denied
4
0

NSF paychecks
Sexual or racial

3
1

2
0

0
0

1
1

harassment
Miscellaneous

3

1

0

2

Working conditions

2

1

0

1

Medical

1

0

0

1

Care for family
member

1

0

0

1

# Remanded

& medical

employee did not request adherence to rigid payment schedule, and no medical evidence was
presented).
76. See O'Neal's Bus Serv., Inc., v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 269 A.2d 247, 248 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1970) (concerning a sixty-six year-old school bus driver who quit because children were
harassing him and he feared for his safety and court upheld finding that bus driver had raised
concerns with school and supervisors).
77. See Homing v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 112 A.2d 405, 407 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955)
(concerning a dispute over whether employee quit or was discharged since employee refused to
work overtime and also alleged that employer had violated hiring agreement with Veteran's
Administration); Malloy v. Commonwealth, 523 A.2d 834, 836-37 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987)
(involving an owner's son who told employee he was fired and owner's wife later said son had no
authority to fire employee and he should talk to her husband, but employee left anyway).
78. See Hussey Copper Ltd. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 718 A.2d 894, 901 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1998) (involving employee who waited several months to report co-worker's sexual harassment
and threats of termination and after she did report, employers failed to take action, so employee quit
when co-worker shattered a light above her and glass hit her head but court denied benefits because
employee had constructive notice of sexual harassment policy and failed to use it).
79. See Robinson v. Commonwealth, 532 A.2d 952, 953 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (employee
quit to care for ill father in another state. Court denied benefits for failure to make reasonable effort
to maintain employment relationship, because she did not ask for leave of absence, tell employer
why she was quitting, or consider relocating her father).
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C.

In the Trenches

In the following section, I look beyond the appellate and trial court
decisions in exhaustion cases to see what additional recurrent issues
never reach the judicial system, and to identify concerns arising out of
the approaches taken at the administrative agency level. For this
purpose, I have reviewed the published administrative agency decisions
from the State of Washington.
In Washington State, selected agency decisions are designated as
precedential decisions and published in digest form. ° The digested
decisions are considerably sketchier in their descriptions of the facts than
most of the appellate decisions. In addition, the agency decisions
constitute a non-representative pool selected by the agency on topics
presumably considered unsettled in Washington. Nonetheless, the
ninety-three exhaustion decisions presumably addressed topics that the
agency considered to be sufficiently likely to recur to justify publication.
Thus, they provide a useful comparison to the appellate cases.
The Washington agency decisions are similar to the national
appellate and trial courts in the types of quits involved. The agency and
appellate court cases include similar percentages of cases involving quits
for medical reasons, as opposed to quits due to working conditions: 29%
of the agency cases, and 24% of the appellate cases, but only 15% of the
trial court cases. The Washington agency decisions include only one
case (1%) argued as a "quit to save marriage" case, in contrast to the
three cases out of the forty from the national appellate court survey.
80. This process is authorized by WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.32.095 (West 2001), though
the statute gives no guidance as to weight to be given these decisions.
81. One hundred and three entries are listed under "Voluntary Leaving-Effort to Retain
Employment" in the index to these decisions. Of these, I have not considered nine in my analysis.
Of these, three are arguably mis-indexed and do not address efforts to retain employment: In re
Brand, Comm'n Decision 2d 111 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1975) (stating that court decided
it as a firing/misconduct case); In re Harper, Comm'n Decision 1197 (Wash. Employment Sec.
Dep't 1974); In re Stebenne, Comm'n Decision 945 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1973)
(involving employee who quit because too exhausted to deal effectively with responsibility for three
children, ten-, eleven-, and twelve years-old but court held this did not qualify as a "compelling
personal reason" under statute, distinguishing cases involving inability to find childcare, where
claimants attempted to solve situation by alternative means). An additional seven entries are
indexed under "Insufficient Effort Made" or "No Effort Made," but the decision does not rest on the
exhaustion issue, simply citing the requirement, or making no reference to it: In re Bell, Comm'n
Decision 2d 856 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1996); In re Marinkovic, Comm'n Decision 2d
848 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1995); In re Nordstrom, Comm'n Decision 1136 (Wash.
Employment Sec. Dep't 1974); In re Shute, Comm'n Decision 1176 (Wash. Employment Sec.
Dep't 1974); In re Phillips, Comm'n Decision 1033 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1973); In re
Babka, Comm'n Decision 522 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1963); In re Ehlers, Comm'n
Decision 338 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1956).
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The appellate cases include six sexual harassment cases from five
jurisdictions, including two cases from the Washington intermediate
court.2 The agency issued only one precedential decision concerning
sexual harassment, perhaps because the two Washington appellate cases
took a more generous approach toward the employee in considering the
exhaustion requirement than did the agency, leaving little room for
83
agency interpretation.
D. Common Themes in the Cases
1. The Relationship Between Good Cause and Exhaustion
Although on its face the exhaustion requirement is analytically
separate from the question of whether the individual has good cause for
leaving, the two questions are often conflated. This conflation seems to
occur in three different ways.
First, in some cases the exhaustion requirement seems to be simply
another way of evaluating the reason for quitting. For instance, in one
appellate case, the court seems to say that the test for whether the reason
for quitting is sufficiently strong is measured by whether the individual
had alternatives. In Rogers v. Trim House,84 the court stated,
"terminating employment because the employee believed his honesty
was in question does not constitute such a circumstance that compels
him to leave his employment. Rogers had viable options available to him
to remedy the tension between himself and his employer other than to
resign."85
Though other cases are less explicit, often a determination that the
individual has not exhausted alternatives to quitting seems to operate as
another way of saying that the reason for quitting was not sufficiently
compelling, or that the decision maker simply did not believe the
employee's explanation.86
82. See, e.g., Bowman v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., 898 P.2d 492 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995);
Jensen v. Siemsen, 794 P.2d 271 (Idaho 1990); Hunt v. Fairview Ridges Hosp., No. CO-90-2638,
1991 Minn. App. LEXIS 477 (Minn. Ct. App. May 8,1991) (unpublished opinion); DiGiannantoni
v.Wedgewater Animal Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 1378 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Sweitzer v. State, 718
P.2d 3 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986); Hussa v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 664 P.2d 1286 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1983).
83. See Sweitzer, 718 P.2d at 7; Hussa, 664 P.2d at 1290.
84. 588 P.2d 945 (Idaho 1979).
85. Id. at 950.
86. See, e.g., Molenda v. Thomsen, 772 P.2d 1303, 1304 (N.M. 1989); In re Clerico, Comm'n
Decision 760 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1984) (involving an employee who quit to be near
sons inCalifornia after youngest son was killed but agency held no showing that death of son
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A second, flip side of this notion, is that at least some decision

makers appear to find the reason for quitting more credible, or more
compelling, if the employee has been a "squeaky wheel" and raised the

concerns repeatedly.87
In a third group of cases, the decision maker seems to treat the
reason for quitting and the exhaustion requirement as operating on
linked scales, with less required to establish exhaustion as the reason for
quitting becomes more egregious. This is demonstrated most acutely in
the line of cases that waives the exhaustion requirement where the
employer had knowledge that it was violating a statute.88 It appears also
to be present, however, in cases involving serious safety concerns
(maybe not), or hardship on employees due to delayed payment of
89
wages.
2.

The Decision to Quit Rather than Risk Being Fired

In many jurisdictions, decision makers accord no weight to an
employee's decision that the appropriate choice is to quit, rather than be
fired. 0 Thus, even an employee who has been given a written warning to
improve performance or face firing may be found to have "jumped the
gun" and failed to exhaust alternatives to quitting, because the "obvious"

necessitated leaving work, or that employee exhausted all reasonable alternatives to quitting); In re
Eickmeyer, Comm'n Decision 2d 670 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1981) (concerning an
employee who failed to provide medical statement concerning medical leave, so employer
terminated employment and agency treated it as a "constructive quit" case, suggesting that
employee could have negotiated alternative).
87. See In re Spencer, Comm'n Decision 1168 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1974) (stating
that, out of five commissioners' decisions, in the only case favorable to an employee who quit due
to friction with supervisor, the employee had complained to personnel manager and union).
88. See, e.g., Martini v. State, 990 P.2d 981, 985 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
89. See O'Neal's Bus Serv., Inc. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 269 A.2d 247, 248 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1970) (involving a sixty-six year old school bus driver who quit because children were
harassing him and he feared for his safety and court upheld finding that bus driver had raised
concerns with school and supervisors). See generally Koman v. Commonwealth, 435 A.2d 277 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1981).
90. In some jurisdictions, this view is explicitly incorporated into a distinction between a
"quit in lieu of termination," where an employee has been told that she/he will be fired, and is
permitted to resign instead, and a "quit in anticipation of termination." In the former case, the
employee is treated as having been fired, and will be eligible for benefits, unless she/he was fired
for "misconduct." In the latter case, the employee is treated as having quit, and is ordinarily denied
benefits. See, e.g., In re Miller, Comm'n Decision 2d 147 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1976); In
re Trumbull, Comm'n Decision 2d 245 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1976); cf Anderson v.
Director, 957 S.W.2d 712 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997); Thomas v. District of Columbia Dep't of Labor,
409 A.2d 164 (D.C. 1979); Carpenter v. Dist. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 409 A.2d 175
(D.C. 1979).
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alternative for the employee is to improve performance.9 ' Thus, an odd
combination of initiative and passivity seems to be expected of workers.
They should have enough initiative to improve their work performance,
but not enough to independently conclude that they are unlikely to
satisfy the employer's standards, and thus, that they should quit rather
than wait to be fired.
3. The Risks Placed on the Employees
Two types of cases suggest that some lower-level decision makers,
especially expect employees to shoulder significant risks before they
will be considered to have good cause for quitting. In the first type,
involving "late paychecks," the employer failed to pay the employee in a
timely fashion, either paying in checks that bounced for insufficient
93
funds, 92 failing to pay for overtime hours despite repeated requests, or
being asked to take pay out of the till, which was then emptied by the
employer.94 In most of these cases, the employee was eventually granted
benefits by the court or agency.9 The striking aspect of these cases,
however, is that the lower-level decision makers expected the employees
to work despite a high risk that they might never get paid, if the
employer was insolvent, or that they would get paid in an untimely
fashion.96 These lower-level decision makers seemed oblivious to the
fact that most workers have little or no savings, and live from paycheck
to paycheck.97 For most workers, the risk of never getting paid, likely to
be a significantly higher one where the employer has such serious cash
flow problems that employees cannot be paid on time, has unacceptably
serious consequences. Even delayed payment of one or two weeks can
lead to bounced checks (or in twenty-first century lives, bounced
automatic payments by electronic funds transfer) or an inability to pay
bills on time, with ever mounting late payment and other fees.
In a second type of case, involving safety, decision makers often
require the employee to raise concerns, not just with the foreman or
91. See, e.g., In re Pederson, Comm'n Decision 1224 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1975);
In re Quen, Comm'n Decision 1166 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1974).
92. See Cavitt v. Employment Div., 803 P.2d 778, 779 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (involving
employee's paycheck which was returned for insufficient funds on two occasions).
93. See In re Hicks, Comm'n Decision 1000 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1973).
94. See In re Meyer, Comm'n Decision 1158 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1974).
95. See Cavitt, 803 P.2d at 778; In re Meyer, Comm'n Decision 1158; In re Hicks, Comm'n
Decision 1000.
96. See Cavitt, 803 P.2d at 778; In re Meyer, Comm'n Decision 1158; In re Hicks, Comm'n
Decision 1000.
97. See Cavitt, 803 P.2d at 778; In re Meyer, Comm'n Decision 1158; In re Hicks, Comm'n
Decision 1000.
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immediate supervisor, but to raise them with higher-level supervisors, or
the union, despite potential risks to life or limb.9" This expectation
requires the worker to live with the risks for whatever time is required
for the high level supervisors or the union to address the problem, a time
period that may be substantial.
4. Specific Actions Required
The cases address five specific actions that have at times been
required in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, but that prove
controversial.
a. Going Over the Head of the Immediate Supervisor
As in the case described in the Introduction, many decision makers
apparently impose a requirement that the employee must complain not
only to the foreman or immediate supervisor, but must also go above the
supervisor's head, to a higher-level supervisor, even an off-site one, or to
the personnel department. Occasionally, this requirement is explicit.99 At
other times, it may be submerged in a general statement that the
individual did not exhaust alternatives. As I argue below, such a
requirement imposes a significant risk that the individual will suffer
retaliation for going outside the "chain of command."' °

98. See In re Vliet, Comm'n Decision 454 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1961) (involving
employee who quit, due to violations of safety rules while working as a high scaler on a
construction project, after complaining to foreman, but not to union, and commissioner granted
benefits, setting aside initial decision, stating that good cause usually requires a complaint to a
supervisor and/or the union, but applies an exception when the danger to life is such as to require
immediate action); cf In re Townsend, Comm'n Decision 2d 302 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't
1977) (concerning employee who quit, claiming undue risks to safety in operation of a cooling
station, and produced three witnesses, including ex-foreman, who concurred and stated,
"[e]mployee brought complaints to assistant superintendent, the foreman and union. All three
agreed that his complaints were well founded. The petitioner made three attempts to get the
superintendent to remedy the situation" and the initial decision maker denied benefits on the
grounds that "the employer was regularly inspected by government safety inspectors, and the
employer had not been cited ....
" but the Commissioner reversed and granted benefits). See also
Condo v. Bd. of Review, 385 A.2d 920, 921 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (involving claimant
who left position, due to continuing threats of physical harm from co-employee, after he informed
management and they spoke to co-worker, and agency decision denying benefits was reversed by
Superior Court on grounds that claimant did not have to continue to expose himself to the risk of
bodily harm).
99. See In re Vliet, Comm'n Decision 454; In re Barnett, Wash. Office of Admin. Hearings
No. 2-04445, Rev. No. 9-21200 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1992); In re Nissen, Wash. Office
of Admin. Hearings No. 2-05202, Rev. No. 9-21201 (Wash. Employment Sec. Dep't 1992).
100. See infra text accompanying note 146.
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b. Filing a Grievance with the Union
In unionized workplaces, many cases require employees to raise
their complaints with the union in order to be treated as having
exhausted alternatives to quitting. This is especially true as to complaints
that would constitute a breach of the collective bargaining contract) °l
This makes sense where three conditions are present: the union is strong
enough that it could force a change in the employer's actions; the union
has a visible enough workplace presence so that employees should be
expected to know how to file a work grievance through them; and the
union and its members are not beset by the type of internal conflicts or
conflicts of interest that too often have resulted in the union favoring a
dominant group at the expense of marginalized workers.' 2
c. Contacting a Responsible Government Agency
An occasional case suggests that an individual must contact the
government agency responsible for regulating employer behavior in the
area, for instance, of health and safety, or minimum wage violations.' 3
This can have the ironic effect of permitting the employer to either flout
or remain ignorant of applicable government regulation, but holding the
employee to both a sophisticated level of knowledge concerning the
regulatory environment, and an ability to negotiate that environment. In
my view, such a requirement places an inappropriate burden on
employees, especially the least sophisticated and powerful among them.
d. Transfers
In many voluntary quit cases, especially those where the worker
quits due to personal illness or disability, or the need to care for a family
member, the individual may be denied benefits unless she talked to the
employer about the problem and requested a transfer. The employee may
be allowed to demonstrate that doing so would have been futile because
a transfer would have been unavailable. Requiring the employee to

101. See, e.g., Glennen v. Employment Div., 549 P.2d 1288 (Or. Ct. App. 1976);
Aschenbrenner v. Employment Div., 563 P.2d 757 (Or. Ct. App. 1977); Lee v. Virginia
Employment Comm'n, 335 S.E.2d 104 (Va. Ct. App. 1985). Contra Garcia v. Dep't of Employment
& Training, 488 A.2d 762 (Vt. 1985).
102. See Carl E. Brody, Jr., A HistoricalReview of Affirmative Action and the Interpretationof
Its Legislative Intent by the Supreme Court, 29 AKRON L. REV. 291, 318 (1995) (discussing the
historical racism and sexism of labor unions).
103. This was apparently the rationale of the agency and lower court decisions reversed in
Umbargerv. Virginia Employment Commission, 404 S.E.2d 380 (Va. Ct. App. 199 1).
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request a transfer, or show that doing so would be futile, raises two
concerns about evidentiary burdens.
The initial concern is who should bear the burden of raising the
question of transfer. Certainly, the employer can not be expected to raise
the question, unless it knows that the employee has a problem that is
causing difficulty with the job. But once the employee has notified the
employer of these difficulties, why should the employee be required to
raise the transfer issue? Placing the burden on the employer instead
seems more consistent with employees' assumptions. As one employee
stated in her hearing, "'I figured-you know-if there was a job he
would say something."" 4 In addition, however, placing the burden on
the employer seems consistent with normal rules concerning burdens of
proof or of going forward, which place the burden on the party having
superior knowledge or access to information.' ° In these cases, the
employer has superior knowledge about both policy; its willingness to
authorize transfers, and practicalities; the availability of positions.
An additional concern is what type of evidence should suffice to
establish futility or lack thereof. When an employee argues that
requesting a transfer would have been futile, the employer typically
responds by asserting that positions were available elsewhere in the
company. In my experience, the employer's claim is typically credited,
even if it is quite general and the employer does not cite specific jobs in
specific locations. Once again, this is a situation in which the employee
typically has limited access to information about the availability of other
jobs. Thus, it is inappropriate to place the burden on the employee to
establish that requesting a transfer would have been futile.
e.

Provide Medical Evidence

In cases where individuals quit for medical reasons, some statutes
require that the individual must notify the employer of the reason for
quitting.'0 6 Where such requirements are interpreted as requiring the
104. Kingery v. Adm'r, No. 1251, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 8563, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
30, 1986) (Grey, J., dissenting) (involving an employee who quit work on advice of doctor after she
experienced heart problems after having returned to work on the assembly line, she traded jobs with
a coworker because she was having trouble keeping up and continued to have difficulty keeping up,
discussed the problem with the coworker, and applied unsuccessfully for an office job and the court
upheld the denial of benefits on the grounds that she did not adequately discuss the possibility of
other positions with her employer because she did not request a transfer).
105. See Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12
STAN. L. REV. 5, 12 (1959).
106. See, e.g., MINN.STAT. ANN. § 268.095 subd. 1(7) (West Supp. 2002); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 50-7-303(a)(1) (Supp. 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.20.050(2)(b) (West 2001).
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individual to provide medical evidence documenting the medical
problem, this often creates a significant barrier for the growing number
of individuals who lack the medical insurance that provides easy access
to care and a primary care doctor who is familiar with the individual's
situation. The requirement provides a further barrier in cases where the
medical reason for quitting involves mental health concerns that the
individual may not initially understand or be willing to acknowledge.
f. Requesting a Leave of Absence
An additional requirement commonly imposed in medical quit
cases is that the employee must request a leave of absence, or request,
either before leaving or when well, reemployment effective as of the
date he is able. Typically, the individual would be ineligible for benefits
during the course of the leave of absence, because the individual would
not be "able and available for work" as is universally required in order to
qualify for benefits.' 7 When the medical problem subsides, however, the
individual will have a job waiting for him and will not need to apply for
unemployment benefits.
Many employers have strenuously opposed mandatory availability
of leave, as required by the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"),' °8
arguing that keeping jobs open for employees who may end up never
returning imposes a significant cost burden on them. There is, thus, a
certain irony in requiring a claimant to request leave under the FMLA in
order to qualify for benefits, where the employee's failure to make such
a request simply substitutes one burden on the employer (increased
unemployment taxes) for another (the cost of holding the position open).
Absent evidence that the burden of increased unemployment taxes is
higher than the cost of holding the position open, requiring the employee
to request a leave of absence may result in the FMLA simply
functioning as a barrier to employees receiving unemployment
benefits-one more hoop for the unwary employee to jump through.
IV.

A FRAMEWORK: HIRSCHMAN'S EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY

In 1970, Professor Albert 0. Hirschman published a volume titled
Exit, Voice and Loyalty,"9 whose slim size belied its future impact.
Beginning with his observation of the sorry state of the Nigerian

107. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 50.20.010(3) (West 2001).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2000).

109.

ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
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Railway Corporation, he inquired into the circumstances (including
"loyalty") that lead consumers to complain about a decline in the quality
of a product ("voice"), rather than simply switching to another product
("exit")."10 As Hirschman understood, "exit" is the default mode within
modern economic analysis."' Consumers are expected to choose the
cheapest, highest quality product that meets their needs, switching
readily, with no expectation that they are obliged to complain to the
manufacturer or service provider if quality drops." 2 By contrast,
articulation of "voice" is the expected behavior in the political realm. "'
Citizens in a democracy are expected to exercise their voice rather than
renounce their citizenship. Thus, the argument is commonly made that
those who failed to vote have no right to complain about government
policies.
Although exit is the norm within the economic realm, consumers
do sometimes develop brand loyalty based on unique characteristics of
the product, and do occasionally complain rather than simply abandon
their preferred product.' '4 Indeed the modern enterprise of advertising is
significantly focused on an attempt to manufacture loyalty. Much of
Hirschman's project was focused on identifying both the circumstances
that lead consumers to exercise voice in the economic realm rather than
exit, and the circumstances in which the exercise of voice is needed for
maximum economic efficiency, because the feedback generated by
declining sales would come only after the firm declines beyond
recovery.
Hirschman's initial focus on the economic realm broadened as he
realized that his framework has important applications throughout
society, shedding light on such questions as: "When do high government
officials choose to resign in protest against policies they oppose, rather
than raise their concerns within the government?" ' 16 and "When do
' 7
marriage partners choose divorce rather than working it out?" "
Hirschman captured broadly applicable concerns in a catchy, easy to

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See id. at 44-45.
See id. at 2.
See id. at 3-4.
See id. at 15.
See id. at 4.
See id. at 30-36.
See id. at 108.
See id. at 79.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:459

understand set of labels. Thus, it is not surprising that the "exit, voice,
and loyalty" trilogy has been heavily used in subsequent research." 8
In her brilliant articles on battered women and on sexual
harassment, Professor Martha Mahoney has argued that the ideology of
exit permeates contemporary thinking about both work and love
relationships."'
Prevailing ideology in both law and popular culture holds that people
are independent and autonomous units, free to leave any situation at
any time, and that what happens to us is therefore in some measure the
product of our choice. When women are harmed in love or work, the
idea of exit becomes central to the social and legal dialogue in which
our experience is processed, reduced, reconstructed and dismissed. 20
Thus, for women subjected to either battering or sexual harassment,
the question asked is always: "Why didn't she leave?" Note, however, a
certain ambiguity in the ideology that Mahoney describes. The
requirement of exit can be premised on an assumption that people are
independent and autonomous, and thus in a certain view, powerful. Yet,
this bias towards exit can also assume powerlessness, a choice to exit
precisely because one lacks the power to exercise voice effectively
within the context of the relationship. And indeed, in the context of both
battering and sexual harassment, observers may assume that the
individual subject to harassment has no access to voice within the
relationship and those observers may ignore the coercion, safety
concerns, subsistence needs, and emotional attachment that often prevent
women from leaving.
In the case of workers voluntarily leaving their jobs, what
assumptions underlie the exhaustion requirement that insists on workers
exercising voice? Both empirical and normative assumptions seem to
underpin the exhaustion requirement. Empirically, the exhaustion
requirement assumes that workers have sufficient power to decide to
exercise voice, and exercise it effectively without assuming undue risks
of adverse consequences. Normatively, the requirement seems to be
founded on a vision of the workplace as a community in which each
participant has, if not equal voice, sufficient voice, and an obligation to
118. See, e.g., CHARLES HECKSCHER, WHITE-COLLAR BLUES: MANAGEMENT LOYALTIES IN
AN AGE OF CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 4 (1995).

119. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and
the ConfirmationHearings,65 S. CAL. REV. 1283, 1283 (1992) [hereinafter Exit Power]; Martha R.
Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV.
1,2(1991).
120. Exit Power,supra note 119, at 1283.
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exercise it. In other words, the workplace is more like a political
community than an economic marketplace.
In the pages below, I argue that for many workers the empirical
assumption has little relationship to reality. In many circumstances,
workers will not subjectively believe they have that power and whether
they do in fact will be so context-dependent that the decision whether to
exercise voice should be left up to the individual, not to legislators and
judges. In addition, I argue that the vision of the workplace as more like
a political community than an economic marketplace, is an attractive
aspiration, but one with little foundation in many twenty-first century
workplaces.
V.

CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE EXHAUSTION
REQUIREMENT: THE PRACTICAL REALITIES OF EXERCISING VOICE

The unemployment compensation system is often characterized as
one designed to provide benefits to workers who are "unemployed
through no fault of their own." Thus, imposing an exhaustion
requirement on workers will seem justified if exercising voice is a
practical choice that can be expected to make the worker better off. Yet,
as I argue below, in many cases, exhausting alternatives to quitting will
appear both impractical and risky.
A.

The Assumptions Underlying the Exhaustion Requirement

Three assumptions underlie the exhaustion requirement, whether
imposed by the legislature, the judiciary, or the agency. The first
assumption is that workers in fact have alternatives to quitting. The
reference to alternatives presumably does not refer to the alternative of
simply staying at the job and proceeding with business as usual. That
alternative is always available, but presumably is not considered a
"reasonable" alternative where the individual has good cause for leaving.
The requirement seems to assume that some other alternatives are
available: raising concerns with the supervisor or seeking a transfer to
another position. The validity of this assumption will, of course, vary
with the place of employment. Supervisors may be more or less open to
hearing complaints. Other positions may or may not be available, and
the worker may or may not have transferable skills.
The exhaustion requirement assumes, secondly, that potential
alternatives are practical. That is, that utilizing these alternatives is
sufficiently "safe" that the individual can reasonably pursue them, and
that the worker has the knowledge and skills to pursue them effectively.
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As I will argue below, for a variety of reasons workers often seem not to
feel safe enough to raise their concerns. Workers rightly understand that
being fired may have a highly negative effect on their employability, and
many are risk-averse about taking actions that could lead to retaliation
by the employer.
The third assumption underlying the requirement is that we can
fairly identify "reasonable efforts to preserve the employment" or what
"things a reasonably prudent person would have done." Yet, that effort
masks significant complexities. As numerous critiques of the
"reasonable person" standard in tort, employment and domestic violence
law have demonstrated over the last fifteen years, what seems reasonable
behavior is heavily influenced by gender, race, and class factors that can
be glossed over when a unitary standard is applied.'2 ' What makes sense
depends very much on the individual's circumstances. Yet, perhaps
inevitably, each of us seems to assume that the reasonable person is the
one who behaves like us. What happens all too easily in unemployment
compensation hearings is that the "reasonable person" becomes the
"reasonable lawyer": well-educated, aware of her rights, verbally
articulate, relatively powerful, confident of being heard, and relatively
unconcerned about retaliation.
Embedded in the concept "reasonable person" is another important
question that has both theoretical and practical dimensions. Is the
"reasonable person" determined empirically or normatively?. 2 In other
words, is identifying the behavior of a "reasonable person" a matter of
determining empirically what most people do, or is it a matter of
deciding normatively how we think they should behave?'23
121. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman
Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398 (1992).
122. Thanks to Jean Braucher for noting the relevance of this question.
123. Historically, the reasonable person of tort law seemed to be very much a normative ideal.
With the developing research on "behavioral economics," however, scholars are beginning to
question the validity of the "rational actor" assumption that underlies traditional law and economics.
For a recent summary, see generally, CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky eds., 2000). As Professor Cynthia Estlund recently noted:
The law often relies on assumptions about human behavior and cognition that
correspond to the economists' 'rational actor' model. The venerable 'reasonable man'
himself embodies some of these assumptions .... Should the 'reasonable person' be
presumed to think one way if we know that actual people process information in
predictably different ways?
Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does it Matter?, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 6 (2002). While I would answer that question "no," my focus in this section is a
different one: Should the "reasonable person" be presumed to act one way, if we know that many
people do not act that way in practice and the empirical evidence suggests that they have good
reasons for acting the way that they do? While the cognitive biases described in the behavioral
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While this Article is not the place to address that question in detail,
I suggest that if most people do not in fact behave in the way we think
they should, it may well be that we are overlooking good reasons why,
and that our normative view of how they should behave is inappropriate
given the realities of people's lives. As I demonstrate below, most
people124 do not behave like "reasonable lawyers" in deciding whether to
quit their jobs, and their behavior is often appropriate given their
circumstances.
B. Challenging the Assumptions
On first glance, the assumptions underlying the exhaustion
requirement may seem not merely plausible, but obvious-just basic
common sense. After all, unemployment insurance is for people who are
unemployed through no fault of their own, so we should not pay benefits
to people who could have avoided quitting if they had only talked to
their employer. In addition, the employer shouldn't be penalized by
paying for unemployment benefits 12 when the employee did not give the
employer a chance to address her concerns.
Yet, we know that real people often do not raise workplace
concerns with their employers.'26 As I will argue below,'27 the
assumptions underlying the exhaustion requirement founder on three
practical realities. First, given the importance of wages in modem life,
employees are understandably risk-averse, and they properly fear the
possibility they will be fired, or suffer other retaliation for complaining,
more than they fear quitting. This fear of being fired is linked to fears of
the many negative consequences that might follow from being fired. At
its worst, firing may set off a chain of events that begins with being
unable to pay the rent or mortgage and ends with being homeless. The
fear of being a "bag lady" is a powerful one. Second, many are reluctant
to exercise voice because they lack the power and skill needed to
economics literature, such as loss aversion, endowment effects, and framing, might well come into
play in the decision to quit work without attempting to exhaust alternatives, such an analysis is not
required for critiquing the exhaustion requirement.
124. Actually, I suggest that when their jobs are at risk even many attorneys are reluctant to
engage in the behaviors often demanded by judges applying the exhaustion standard.
125. Unemployment benefits are funded through state payroll taxes on the employer that are
credited against the Federal Unemployment Tax Act ("FUTA") tax. See 26 U.S.C. § 3302 (2000).
Most employers are subject to "experience rating" which means that their tax rate increases if more
unemployment benefits are paid out to their former employees.
126. Research in the context of sexual harassment has shown that a small proportion of
employees subjected to harassment make use of formal grievance procedures. See infra note 230.
127. See infra Part V.B.
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exercise voice effectively, or they have learned over the course of their
lives that raising their voice is dangerous and does not result in their
being heard. Third, regarding certain issues that predictably arise
concerning the exhaustion requirement-such as demonstrating that
exhausting specified alternatives would have been futile-Workers have
little hope of effectively countering the employer's assertions given the
short and informal nature of unemployment insurance hearings.
1. Legitimate Risk-Averseness
Most Americans short of retirement age rely primarily, or
exclusively, on wages for their income. Thus, interruption of the
stream of wages can have dire consequences. Without wages the worker
may be unable to pay rent or mortgage payments, may find her or his
automobile repossessed, or may be unable to make credit card and other
debt payments." 9 Indeed, job loss is a significant risk factor for going
bankrupt.'3 ° Thus, we might expect most workers to be highly "riskaverse" about losing their job. Indeed, underlying the exhaustion
requirement seems to be the view that workers should be risk-averse
when it comes to quitting employment. In this section, I argue that
because workers are often, quite properly, more risk-averse about being
fired or subjected to other forms of retaliation than about quitting,
imposing an exhaustion requirement in voluntary quit cases is bad
policy.

128. Wage and salary disbursements accounted for $4.469 billion of Americans' $7.776 billion
in personal income for 1999. See BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS:

PERSONAL INCOME BY MAJOR SOURCE, tbl.5 (June 2000), at

http://www.bea.gov/bea/articles/regional/Persinc/2000/0600spi.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2003). In
addition, according to the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances, the first in which the question was
asked, 42.9% of families saved nothing from their income, and the 1992 survey showed a higher
percentage of families saving than the 1995 and 1998 surveys. See Arthur B. Kennickell et al.,
Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Results from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances,

FED. RESERVE BULL. 3-4, tbl.1 (Jan. 2000). 1 have not found data that directly tracks how many
families rely solely on wages for their income, but it seems likely that it is a substantial proportion.
129. In 1998, 44.1% of American families held credit card balances after paying their most
recent bills. The median amount of debt totaled $1700 and almost half of cardholders "hardly ever"
(26.9%) or only "sometimes" (19.3%) pay off the balance. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 510, tbl.794 (2000).

Some observers suspect that federal reports on consumer debt understate the total credit
card amount outstanding ....[S]elf-reported debt is far lower than the amount of debt
reported by credit card issuers ... [T]he government reports 50 million families making
credit card payments on an estimated $500 billion in outstanding credit card debt, which
would suggest an average of $10,000 per family.
TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS INDEBT 319 n. 14 (2000).
130.

See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 129, at 75-108.
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a. Fear of Being Fired
When asked why they did not raise their concerns with their
supervisor, or pursue it up the chain of command, workers often
respond, "I was afraid I'd be fired."'' The first time or two that I heard
this response, I thought, "But you were at the end of your rope, ready to
quit anyway. You were going to be out of a job one way or another,
what difference does it make whether the employer fires you? The
income stream will be interrupted either way." On reflection, however, it
seems clear to me that I was the naYve one. The workers were sensibly
protecting their interests, correctly perceiving that the consequences of
being fired are much worse than the consequences of quitting, and that
the risk of being fired in retaliation for complaining is not
inconsequential.
i. Differing Consequences of Being Fired and Quitting
For a worker, being fired is more damaging than voluntarily
quitting a job in two important ways. First, a worker who has been fired
is likely to have significantly more difficulty finding the next job than a
similar worker who quits. As Daniel Polsky's recent study of the
changing consequences of job loss demonstrates, workers who quit their
jobs had a higher probability of reemployment during both periods
studied (1976-1981 and 1986-1991) than workers who were fired. 3 2 In
addition, "[t]he decline over time in the probability of reemployment
was much smaller for quitters than for job losers."'33 Moreover, workers
job loss typically obtain lower quality jobs as
subjected to involuntary
34
wages.1
by
measured
The serious consequences of involuntary job loss appear to be
particularly serious for workers in historically marginalized groups. As
Paul Attewell's recent study notes:

131. See, e.g., Steffen v. Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, 814 P.2d 29, 30 (Idaho 1991)
(involving a probationary legal secretary who quit after co-worker was fired); DiGiannantoni v.
Wedgewater Animal Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 1378, 1380 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (concerning a
woman who did not complain to boss about his sexual harassment of her because she feared she
would be fired); Hussey Copper Ltd. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 718 A.2d 894, 897 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1998) (involving a woman who waited several months to report sexual harassment by
co-worker because she feared she would be fired).
132. See Daniel Polsky, Changing Consequences of Job Separation in the United States, 52
IND. & LAB. RELATIONS REV. 565, 573-75 (1999).
133. Id. at573.
134. See id. at 575.
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[E]ven though people of color are not at greater risk of initial
displacement than whites, once displaced, people of color are less
likely to find new jobs. Whites' odds of remaining unemployed one or

more years after displacement are 52-58 percent of nonwhites' [odds].
The models show that women are more likely to remain
unemployed than men (they have odds of continued nonemployment
between 38 percent and 90 percent higher than men). Displaced
workers who had not completed high school and those who had only a

high school diploma had far higher rates of long-term unemployment.
Displaced single parents were also significantly more likely to remain

unemployed than other displaced employees, with other factors held
constant.135
The more serious consequences of involuntary job loss as compared
to quitting, is particularly striking when one considers that the
involuntary job loss category lumps together two distinct categories:
workers subjected to mass layoffs, and workers individually fired for
incompetence or worse. Thus, one would expect that Polsky's empirical
data would understate the consequences of being fired, because workers
subjected to mass layoffs should be less "tainted" by the job loss than
workers who have been fired.
Second, being fired from a job is much harder on a worker's
psychological well-being than is quitting. Three critical factors
distinguish being fired from quitting: control, shame, and exclusion.
When an employee quits, he maintains a semblance of control over his
life. By contrast, if the employee waits to see whether he will be fired,
he turns that control over to the employer. Evidence suggests that in
many settings we human beings function best when we believe that the
world operates according to reason and that we have the ability to
control our environment.3 An entire research subspecialty within
psychology has developed to investigate the "locus of control of
reinforcement." This research suggests that individuals with an "internal
locus of control"-people who believe external reinforcement is
contingent on their efforts-are most successful and happiest. Thus, the
people with the characteristics we most want to reinforce are the least
likely to wait passively to be fired, and being fired is likely to make it
difficult for workers to maintain an internal locus of control.
135. Paul Attewell, The Impact of Family on Job Displacement and Recovery, 562 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 66, 79 (1999).

136. See generally

RESEARCH WITH THE Locus OF CONTROL CONSTRUCT

(Herbert M.

Lefcourt ed., 1983).
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In addition to taking away the worker's internal sense of control,
being fired has public consequences and often triggers a sense of shame
and a loss of self-worth both for the worker and for his family. In
modem American culture, an individual's self-identity and self-worth, as
well as social class status, are often linked to employment status. Being
fired is, thus, felt as a very public statement of failure.
Closely related to both control and shame is the effect that being
fired has on a worker's inclusion needs. In differing degrees, we all want
to belong, and we all need approval. Workers spend many hours at work,
and for many individuals, work is both a major focus for their social life,
and a major arena for receiving validation for their skills and
competence. When an individual is fired, she is forcibly excluded from
the work arena, often in circumstances that communicate she is
incompetent.137
ii.

Likelihood of Retaliation

I am aware of no general data concerning the prevalence of
retaliation against workers who raise concerns with their supervisors.
We do, however, have statistical data concerning retaliation in the
context of discrimination claims that suggests the problem is a serious
one. The Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") maintains statistics breaking down charges filed with the
commission by subject matter." "The commission's report on
enforcement activity during 2001 identified retaliation as the basis for
27.5 percent of the claims filed,"'3 9 that is, over 22,000 charges. 40 Those
figures 1represent
a steady increase in retaliation claims over the past
4
decade.
The specific problem of retaliation against "whistle-blowers"
likewise supports the view that retaliation presents a serious risk.

137. The differing psychological consequences of being fired and quitting explain why higherlevel employees, especially, are often offered the opportunity to resign rather than be fired. In many
states the voluntary quit rules specifically recognize that individuals may quit in lieu of being
discharged and treat that circumstance as a discharge for purposes of unemployment benefits. In
such cases the states grant benefits unless the employer can show that the employee engaged in
willful misconduct, rather than requiring the employee to prove that she/he had good cause for
quitting. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
138.

See

UNITED

STATES

EQUAL

EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION,

CHARGE

STATISTICS FY 1992 THROUGH FY 2001, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited
Jan. 30, 2003) [hereinafter EEOC CHARGE STATISTICS].
139. Martha Neil, Drawing the Line, 88 A.B.A. J. 38, 42 (May 2002).
140. See EEOC CHARGE STATISTICS, supra note 138.
141. See id.
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Whistle-blowing has received sufficient attention in recent decades to
generate treatises on the subject.14 As of 1991, thirty-seven states had
enacted statutes prohibiting retaliation against at least some government
4
employees who report violations of law to the appropriate authorities. 1
In addition, seventeen states had enacted statutes protecting privatesector employees in similar circumstances.'" The prevalence of these
statutes, as well as a substantial body of caselaw 4 5 confirms that
employees' fear of retaliation for raising concerns is well-founded at
least where the employer is engaged in illegal activity.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that retaliation is not limited to the
extreme case of complaints about illegal activity. In our clinic we
recently interviewed Ms. N., who worked as a support staffer in a small
but rapidly growing medical practice. Upon taking the job, she was told
that the office was a "staff driven" one and that employees were
expected to "take ownership" of the clinic. Six months after being hired,
however, Ms. N. and other employees raised concerns over excess
workload resulting from the growth of the practice. As a result, Ms. N.
was suspended and told she could not be "reinstated" unless she signed
an agreement to be cooperative and positive.
In another clinic case, our client was fired, and the employer
strenuously and, until the third level of review, successfully opposed the

142.

See generally STEPHEN M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER

(2001); DANIEL P. WESTMAN, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE
(2001).
143. See WESTMAN, supra note 142, at App. A.
144. See id. at App. B.
145. See Kirwin v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 665 F. Supp. 1034, 1036
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (involving a psychologist reassigned after cooperating with investigation of
hospital unit about which she had complained); Poison v. Davis, 635 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (D. Kan.
1986) (concerning the discharge of an employment supervisor who objected to city's failure to
abide by anti-discrimination laws and guidelines); Collins v. Gulf Oil Corp., 605 F. Supp. 1519,
1521 (D. Conn. 1985) (involving an insurance accountant discharged for nonparticipation in
concealment of funds); Avallone v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 553 F. Supp. 931, 932-33 (D. Del.
1982) (concerning a head nurse disciplined after pointing out dangers in patient treatment
procedure); Sossenko v. Michelin Tire Corp., 324 S.E.2d 593, 594 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (involving
an employee who claimed his future with the company was threatened because he reported alleged
defects in experimental tires); Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 87 (N.Y. 1983)
(concerning an assistant treasurer who was fired after reporting illegal accounting practices); see
also Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 620 P.2d 699, 700 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (involving a foreman
who was fired when he indicated intention to proceed with malpractice action against companyowned hospital despite warning that it would be bad for employee relations); Beye v. Bureau of
Nat'l Affairs, 477 A.2d 1197, 1198-99 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (involving an employee who was
forced to resign for informing that co-workers were not given assurance of safety) (cited in Regina
Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress,41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10 n.42 (1988)).
LAW
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grant of unemployment benefits on the grounds that the employee had
engaged in misconduct. The employer had a variety of complaints about
the employee that arose only after she had gone over the head of the
supervisor to ask why she, unlike every other department manager, had
not been eligible for a year-end bonus. 46 Though certain knowledge is
elusive, I strongly suspect that the "real" reason that my client was fired,
is that she complained, and pursued that complaint up the chain of
command. If I am right, her situation is a poignant reminder that
employees' fear of being fired for raising complaints is a well-founded
one.
b.

Fear of Retaliation Affecting Working Conditions

Workers do not just fear that they will be fired if they raise
complaints. They also fear less tangible "retaliation"-being labeled a
"whiner," being penalized in pay and promotion decisions, being given
less favorable assignments or inconvenient shifts, or losing "perks.' 47
Stories about federal government workers who are threatened with
transfer to undesirable locations abound, captured in the metaphor of
being "sent to Siberia." A former student recently described to me a
seminal experience in his formative years, in which his father, a federal
government employee in the Department of Housing and Urban
Development was transferred away from a long-time post, in retaliation
for denying favors to a contributor to the incumbent president.
In her best-selling book about low-wage work, Nickle and Dimed,
Barbara Ehrenreich notes that Wal-Mart has been sued repeatedly by
employees who claim that they were pressured to work unpaid overtime.
The employees claim that they were subjected to a variety of threats,
including "'write-ups, demotions, reduced work schedules or docked
pay"' if they refused to do so.' s

146. I emphasize "eligible for" because the employer did not claim that a bonus was denied for
performance reasons, but rather that the manager of this department was not covered by the bonus
program.
147. See, e.g., Wells v. Thomas, 569 F. Supp. 426, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Shewmaker v.
Minchew, 504 F. Supp. 156, 158 (D.D.C. 1980), affid, 666 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Snyder v.
Sunshine Dairy, 742, P.2d 57, 58 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (cited in Austin, supra note 145, at 10 n.38).
148. BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKLE AND DIMED 183 n.12 (2001) [hereinafter NICKLE AND
DIMED]. None of the litigation has reached the appellate courts. Class certification questions have
been addressed in an opinion in an overtime claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act that makes
no mention of retaliation. See generally Thiebes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CIV.98-802-KI, 2002
WL 479840 (D. Or. Jan. 22, 2002).
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Fear of Bad References

Workers' fears are not limited to concerns about retaliation or
firing-workers also fear actions that the employer may take if they do
not quit, or that the employer may take if the worker quits and is honest
about the reasons for doing so.14' They are also concerned about the
employer's very real power to affect them even after they are gone, by
giving them a bad reference. 5 ° Any thorough and honest employer will
concede that they are very reluctant to hire a worker who indicates
"fired" as the reason for leaving a past job. Our clinic has represented
numerous clients who were in fact fired and found that prospective
employers were prepared to hire them until they talked to the former
employer.
2. Who Uses Voice?
Fear of retaliation is not the only reason that workers refrain from
making complaints. The exhaustion requirement in effect mandates both
notice and negotiation: the individual must bring to the attention of the
employer the workplace conditions that constitute the "good cause" for
quitting, and then negotiate over them. Such a requirement presupposes
that workers have the power, skill, training, and confidence to make their
voices heard effectively. Where those preconditions are absent, imposing
an exhaustion requirement will not promote resolution of workplace
conflicts. Rather, the predictable result is that more workers, especially
low-wage workers, will do without unemployment benefits at a time
when the percentage of unemployed workers receiving benefits is at an
all-time low. 5'
a. Economic Power and Use of Voice
When a worker complains to a supervisor, the worker is attempting
to open a negotiation. Effective negotiation, however, is difficult for a

149. See, e.g., Garcia v. Dep't of Employment & Training, 488 A.2d 762, 763-64 (Vt. 1985)
(involving employee who, on the advice of union officials, indicated resignation was for "personal
reasons" after he was ordered to leave city manager's office when he attempted to report incident in
which chief of police asked him to assist in stealing tables from city garage).
150. Martha R. Mahoney discusses this issue in the context of Anita Hill's testimony in the
Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings. See Exit Power, supra note 119, at 1293-96. Some
employers refuse to give any information other than dates of employment for fear of defamation or
discrimination charges, and some workers seem to believe that this is a legal requirement. It is not a
legal requirement, as other workers well know. Thanks to Kate O'Neill for reminding me about this
wrinkle.
151. See Wandner & Stettner, supra note 8, at 21.
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party who lacks bargaining power and American employees tend to be
singularly lacking in power.
i. Employment-At-Will
In the United States, the default legal framework for employment is
the employment-at-will doctrine, under which employees are subject to
firing without a showing of cause. Although this default framework is
subject to both statutory and contractual exceptions,'5 2 and the doctrine
has been eroded to some extent by the courts, the practical realities
remain. Most employees can be fired at the whim of their supervisor.
Employees likewise can leave their employment for no reason, and in
tight labor markets, this may give them some negotiating leverage with
their employer. However, unless an employee has valuable skills or
training, the power balance typically favors the employer.
To the extent that workers are well-informed about the
employment-at-will regime, we would expect employees' lack of legal
rights to feed employees' fear of retaliation, because most employees
lack any protection against reprisal. Professor Pauline Kim's recent
surveys of workers suggest that workers systematically overestimate the
extent of protection the legal system affords, which might counteract this
effect.'53 However, Professor Kim's results indicate that workers
overwhelmingly understand that they can be fired for poor work
performance.'5 4 My own sense is that in the messy context of real life, in
contrast to responding to the decontextualized, sanitized questions found
on a survey, many workers, especially those who contemplate quitting
their job, will understand that their job is at risk, because rightly or
wrongly, the employer considers their work performance inadequate.
ii. Unionization
Employees can increase their bargaining power by acting in
concert, using the threat to withhold labor jointly. This is, of course, the
152. The primary statutory exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine are found in antidiscrimination laws, which forbid firings based on membership in a protected class, such as race and
ethnicity, gender, religion, and sometimes sexual orientation. Contractual exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine are found primarily in unionized and government settings, though
individual contracts may be negotiated by high-level managerial employees.
153. See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 (1997)
[hereinafter Bargaining]; Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning,and Law: Exploring the Influences on
Workers' Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 447 (1999).
154. See Bargaining, supra note 153, at 134.
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classic strike weapon wielded by employees and legally recognized in
the U.S. since the enactment of the Wagner Act."' The typical employee
in the U.S. lacks the power that comes with numbers, however, because
unions no longer play a significant role in most segments of the
American economy. The percentage of workers who are members of a
union declined steadily from a high of 24.1% in 1979 to 13.5% in
2000, 56 with the percentage of public sector union members holding
steady, while private sector union membership continued to decline from
1983 to 1989.'17 While experts argue over what weight should be given
the various explanations for this decline, one factor unquestionably has
been a sophisticated union-avoidance effort by employers.' 8 This has
involved both vigorous resistance to efforts to unionize new segments of
the workforce, as well as union busting efforts to oust existing unionsefforts often backed up by the threat to move the employer's plants
either to the southern United States or more recently, overseas.'59
This decline in the power of unions has significant implications for
employees' exercise of voice in the workplace. Empirical study has
found that employees are more likely to leave non-union jobs, than
union jobs, even when controlling for the higher wage levels and more
stable workers found in union jobs. 6 ° Unions seem to have a stronger
impact on the exit behavior of those workers who are dissatisfied.' 6' In

155. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
156. See HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR STATISTICS, tbl.9-5, WAGE AND SALARY EMPLOYEES
WHO WERE UNION OR EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATION MEMBERS, 1977-2000 (Eva E. Jacobs ed., 5th ed.
2001).
157. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, tbl.712 (2000).
158.

See Julius G. Getman, Ruminations on Union Organizingin the PrivateSector, 53 U. CHI.

L. REV. 45, 45 (1986).
159. See Benjamin Aaron, Plant Closings: American and Comparative Perspectives, 59 CHI.KENT L. REV. 941, 962 (1983) (quoting R. MCKENZIE, RESTRICTIONS ON BUSINESS MOBILITY 57

(1979)).
160. See Richard B. Freeman, The Exit-Voice Tradeoff in the Labor Market: Unionism, Job
Tenure, Quits, and Separations,94 Q.J. ECON. 643, 644 (1980); Daniel Rees, Essays of Unionism
in the Education Sector (Grievances) (1993) (unpublished dissertation).
161. See Freeman, supra note 160, at 668-69.
Measured by absolute differences in quit rates, unionism clearly has a greater effect on
dissatisfied than on other workers .... Measured as logits of the rates, the picture is less
clear. The logit of the quit rate of union workers increases more slowly than the logit of
the quit rate of nonunion workers as dissatisfaction increases from highly satisfied
persons to dissatisfied persons and from highly satisfied persons to moderately satisfied
persons. However, the logits increase more rapidly for union workers in comparisons of
moderately satisfied and dissatisfied persons. Interpretation of the evidence depends on
the metric and group used to evaluate the differences.
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addition, turnover seems to be lower in segments of the economy and62
among employers having more comprehensive grievance systems.,
Both of these findings are consistent with
the view that unions facilitate
63
the use of voice as an alternative to exit.
iii.

Job Tenure: Race, Gender and Core v. Peripheral
Industries

Research on the roles of gender and race in voluntary job leaving
provides additional support for the view that the decision to use voice,
rather than exit, in response to workplace concerns is in significant part a
function of power. In 1979, official government statistics indicated that
"blacks, women, and youth are two to three times more likely to become
' 4
unemployed from quitting than whites, men, and older employees."'
Though initial analyses attributed this difference in part to unstable work
habits and6 attitudes of these populations, subsequent research suggests
otherwise. 1
Viscusi's extensive study of Sex Differences in Worker Quitting
found that "the primary difference in male and female quit behavior is a
difference in their jobs' characteristics rather than a difference in quit
behavior or personal characteristics.' 66 A subsequent 1985 study
indicated that blacks, women and youths are quit-prone because "they
are disproportionately employed in periphery industries where
institutional arrangements and employment conditions render quitting
162. See id. at 669-70.
163. Similarly, a recent study demonstrates that "at least for blue-collar workers, being
represented by a labor union is significantly associated with the likelihood that an eligible
unemployed worker will receive UI benefits, even after controlling for important demographic, job,
and state UI system attributes." John W. Budd & Brian P. McCall, The Effect of Unions on the
Receipt of Unemployment Insurance Benefits, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 478, 488 (1997).
164. Daniel B. Cornfield, Economic Segmentation and Expression of Labor Unrest: Striking
Versus Quitting in the ManufacturingSector, 66 Soc. SCI. Q. 247, 248 (1985) (quoting BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2000, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS
181-84 (1979)). The comparative "job leavers" rate for women has declined over the intervening
fifteen years. In four of the five years between 1995 and 2000, the job leaver rate for women was
only one-tenth of one percent more than the rate for men, and in the remaining year, the rates were
equal. The job leaver rate for youths aged sixteen to twenty years old continues to be double that of
the general population. See HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 156, at tbls.l-33, 95. 1 have not located current job leaver statistics by race, but the general unemployment rate for
blacks has continued to be about double that of whites, with the rate for Hispanics intermediate
between blacks and whites. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, tbl.674 (2000).
165. See W. Kip Viscusi, Sex Differences in Worker Quitting, 62 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS
388, 396 (1980).
166. Id.
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more feasible than striking.' ' 67 This study looked at the impact of
economic segmentation on differences in striking and quitting in the
manufacturing sector and found that the workers' decision to strike or
quit is significantly affected by the size of the firm, and the wage level
of the employment.168 "Striking is most common in the large-firm
industries
while
quitting
prevails
among
small-firm
industries .... High-wage industries tend to be strike-prone while lowwage industries tend to be quit-prone.' 69 While this study compared
exit--quitting the job-with only one form of voice-striking, the
findings are suggestive in thinking about the exhaustion requirement, for
they suggest that the least powerful workers-those who are socially
marginalized and employed in the lowest paying, least stable jobs, will
be most likely to choose exit over voice.
b. Difference and the Effective Use of Voice
Effective negotiation typically requires more than economic
bargaining power. Also required are a willingness of the other party to
cooperate, a threshold comfort level with making demands on behalf of
oneself, and some level of skill, either innate or developed through
training in linguistic and negotiation strategies. In many situations, one
or more of these circumstances will be missing. Moreover, we have
reason to believe that these circumstances will not be missing in a
neutral fashion. Rather, race, ethnic, class, and gender dynamics may
come into play in some negotiation contexts in ways that tend to
disadvantage non-dominant groups.
i. Lessons from the Research on Negotiations
Though the evidence is limited, "' a recent meta-analysis of studies
investigating gender and negotiation suggests that for a variety of
reasons, women may fare worse in employment negotiations than men. 7'
The study notes that "as much as 3 1% to 34% of the differences between
the wages of men and women can be explained by differences in their

167. Cornfield, supra note 164, at 248.
168. See id. at 247, 249.
169. Id. at 260-61.
170. The sample is not large, because "only a fraction of studies directly report, and the
reported effects are small." Alice F. Stuhlmacher & Amy E. Walters, Gender Differences in
Negotiation Outcome: A Meta-Analysis, 52 PERSONNEL PSYCH. 653, 653-58 (1999).
171. See id. Interestingly one of the studies included in the meta-analysis was a field study
review of "archival data of union grievances." Id. at 663.
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starting salaries,"'' 72 which suggests that women negotiate less effectively
in their initial salary negotiations. At least one study considered in the
meta-analysis found that "power was a better predictor of negotiation
behaviors ... than gender,' '173 which suggests that factors such as social
class, race, and education would also affect negotiating success. These
factors come into play in a variety of complex ways.
As noted above, the first precondition for effective negotiation is
that the other party must be willing to negotiate. This includes both a
willingness to enter negotiations at all and a willingness to modify
demands. In his landmark research on retail car negotiations using
trained, matched pairs of different gender and/or ethnicity, following an
identical script, Professor Ian Ayres identified consistent patterns of
discrimination by automobile dealers in their negotiations with white
and black women, and black men, as compared to white men. Both the
were significantly lower than offers
initial and final offers to white men
7
1
groups.
three
other
the
of
to any
According to Ayres, "sellers' bargaining behavior is broadly
consistent with revenue-based statistical inference as a partial cause.' 76
That is, dealers apparently believed that the disadvantaged groups were
willing to pay more, either because they lacked information about dealer
costs, and/or were less able to comparison shop due to higher costs of
search. 77 In addition, dealers appeared to "discriminate against different
buyer types for different reasons."' 78 Dealers "made the smallest
concessions to and spent the longest time bargaining with black male
testers,"'7 9 a pattern "consistent with the hypothesis that sellers enjoyed
extracting dollars from black males twice as much as extracting dollars
from white males.' 8 ° In the case of black men, this suggests that some of
the discrimination is explainable as a "desire to disadvantage certain
"7

172. Id. at 670 (quoting Barry Gerhart, Gender Differences in Current and Starting Salaries:
The Role of Performance, College Major, and Job Title, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 418 (1990)).
173. Stuhlmacher & Waiters, supra note 170, at 657 (quoting Carol Watson, Gender Versus
Power as a Predictor of Negotiation Behavior and Outcomes, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 117 (1994)).
174. See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations,
104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 818-19, 822-24, 827-41 (1991) [hereinafter Fair Driving]; Ian Ayres,
Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 109, 109-10 (1995) [hereinafter Further Evidence].
175. See Fair Driving, supra note 174, at 827-31.
176. Further Evidence, supra note 174, at 141.
177. See id. at 140-41.
178. Id.
at 141.
179. Id.
at 132.
180. Id. at 132-33.
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buyer types-'consequential animus."" 8 ' On the other hand, "sellers'
discrimination against black females may in part stem from a belief that
black females are more averse to bargaining than white males.' 82
Ayres' research is consistent with the research on racial
discrimination in housing. Housing market research, including research
using "testers," demonstrates that blacks have more difficulty in
obtaining housing than similarly-situated whites.'83 In the case of
housing, the discrimination appears to result in significant part from
steering by real estate agents based on the8 4 perception that white
homeowners do not want to live next to blacks.'
What are the implications of this research for thinking about the
unemployment compensation voluntary quit exhaustion requirement?
We do not know, of course, to what extent the type of discrimination
found in the retail automobile negotiations and the housing purchase
contexts is found in the employment context. Given the welldocumented history of employment discrimination in the United States,
however, I would expect the findings to translate significantly across
contexts. The research provides little basis for a claim that employers
would refuse outright to discuss an employee's concerns. 85 It does,
however, suggest that disfavored groups of employees might get limited
movement in response to their attempts to raise issues. Employers, like
Ayres' automobile dealers, may perceive some employees as having
higher bargaining costs than others, because "they have a greater dislike
for the process of bargaining,"'8 6 or higher search costs for seeking
alternative employment, due, for instance, to childcare or elder care
responsibilities.87 They may perceive some employees as being willing
to accept lower wages and less favorable working conditions because,
for instance, those employees face discrimination in the marketplace, or
are not well-connected to the informal networks that lead to much new
181. Id. at Ill.
182. Id. at 141.
183. See George C. Galster, More Than Skin Deep: The Effect of Housing Discriminationon
the Extent and Pattern of Racial Residential Segregation in the United States, in HOUSING
DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 119, 120-21 (John M. Goering ed., 1986); Douglas S.
Massey & Nancy A. Denton, Trends in the Residential Segregation of Blacks, Hispanics, and
Asians: 1970-1980, 52 AM. Soc. REV. 802, 802 (1987); John Yinger, Measuring Racial
Discriminationwith FairHousing Audits: Caught in the Act, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 881, 881 (1986),
(cited in FairDriving,supra note 174, at 112 n. 14).
184. See Galster, supra note 183, at 32, 120.
185. See generally FairDriving, supra note 174; Further Evidence, supra note 174; Galster,
supra note 183.
186. Further Evidence, supra note 174, at 136.
187. See id. at 139-40 (describing Ayres' theory on cost discrimination).
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hiring.'88 And that likelihood can be expected to have spillover effects on
employees' willingness to make claims.
The second precondition for effective negotiation is a threshold
comfort level with making demands on behalf of oneself. A seminal
article by Professors William Felstiner, Richard Abel, and Austin Sarat
on the transformation of disputes reminds us that in most cases
individuals are inclined to "lump it," rather than to name a problem,
blame a causal agent, or claim a right to a remedy.'89 Thus, we can
expect that many people may be reluctant to make such demands. In
addition, we might expect that members of groups who face an unequal
playing field at the front end might be more reluctant to press their
claims with employers. In her work on women and bargaining, Professor
Carol Rose has provided a theoretical framework to explain how women
may be systematically disadvantaged in the results of negotiations.
[W]omen might systematically do worse than men with respect to
acquiring property, if one makes either of two related assumptions.
The first assumption is that women have a greater "taste for
cooperation" than men. The second, somewhat weaker assumption is
that women are merely perceived to have a greater taste for
cooperation than men, even though that perception may be
190
erroneous.
It is unsurprising that, to the extent that women, for instance, are
socialized to be "selfless," to put others' needs ahead of their own, some
women may find it difficult to press claims on their own behalf. On an
anecdotal level this is certainly consistent with a consistent theme in
informal conversations among women: we may be tenacious negotiators
on behalf of others, but less comfortable negotiating on behalf of
ourselves.
ii. Lessons from the Research on Linguistics
I have suggested that the third precondition for successful
negotiation is a reasonable level of skill in negotiating, either innate or
otherwise. No reason exists to believe that women or minorities are
188. See id. at 138-41 (describing Ayres' theory on revenue discrimination).
189. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 124-25 (1974); see also William L.F. Felstiner et al., The
Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming ... , 15 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 631, 633-37 (1980).
190. Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421,
423 (1992) (citation omitted). A shortened version of this article appears as Bargainingand Gender,
18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 547 (1994).
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innately less capable of negotiating effectively.' 9' We do, however, have
reason to suspect that some groups will be more likely to initiate
negotiations using language that can be easily ignored, both by
employers and by triers of fact who hear unemployment insurance
claims.
Linguistic research suggests that "women more often adopt indirect
and deferential speech patterns," as compared to the "direct and assertive
language" men tend to use.' 92 In her very sophisticated analysis of the
framing of requests for counsel in police interrogations, Professor Janet
Ainsworth dubbed the patterns that were more typical of women, the
female "register."' 93 She was careful to note, however, that "the use of
this register is not exclusively a factor of gender but varies according to
other factors as well" and that "[g]ender differences ... are magnified in
some contexts, particularly when there is a power disparity between the
speaker and the hearer."'94 In addition, drawing on the extensive work of
Professor William O'Barr analyzing court testimony, she concluded that
"this register tends to be adopted in situations in which the speaker is at
a disadvantage in power."' '
Drawing on the linguistic research, Professor Ainsworth sets out in
detail the forms of speech included in the female (or powerless)
register. 96 For our purpose, it is sufficient to note that they include
hedges (e.g. "kind of, sort of, to some extent, I think, I guess, I suppose,
maybe"), tag questions (e.g. adding "isn't it" or "shouldn't I" to a
declarative statement), using modal verbs (e.g. "may, might, could,
should"), not using imperatives (e.g. "Could you solve my problem"
rather than "Solve my problem") and using a "rising intonation in

191. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver & David W. Barnes, Gender, Risk Taking, and Negotiation
Performance,5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299 (1999). Considerable effort has been spent investigating
claims that women are less effective negotiators, and the evidence largely disproves that contention.
See id.
192. Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police
Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 262 (1993); see also Lucie E. White, Subordination,Rhetorical
Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearingof Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1,7 (1990).
193. See Ainsworth, supra note 192, at 273-74. The term "register" as opposed to the broader
"language" or "voice" acknowledges the significance of context in discussing distinctive uses of
language by women. See id. "The concept of register is typically concerned with variation in
language conditioned by uses rather than users and involves consideration of the situation or context
of use, the purpose, subject matter, and content of the message, and the relationship between
participants." SUZANNE ROMAINE, LANGUAGE IN SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
SOCIOLINGUISTICS 21 (2d ed. 2000).
194. Ainsworth, supra note 192, at 274.
195. Id. at 286.
196. See id. at 275-82.
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ordinary declaratives that are not intended to express uncertainty or
incredulity."'97
Linguistic research conducted in the seven years since Professor
Ainsworth's article was published has emphasized the importance of
context in determining the meaning and intent behind a given speech
strategy.'9 8 Professor Deborah Tannen, for instance, has argued that "all
the linguistic strategies that have been taken by analysts as evidence of
subordination can in some circumstances be instruments of
affiliation." '99 Professor Janet Holmes notes that "hedges" or "pragmatic
particles," as she calls them, "can be used to invite participation in the
conversation" or "to soften a critical comment," as well as, to express
uncertainty, and suggests that the same is true of "you know, sort of,
and.., the High Rising Terminal."2 ° Despite this emphasis on the
complexity and ambiguity of linguistic devices, these authors emphasize
both the gendered nature of linguistic strategies and the power dynamics
embedded in them, and elaborate, but do not disavow the research relied
on by Professor Ainsworth'
The speech strategies characteristic of the female, or powerless,
"register" protect the individual against both the possibility of retaliation
and the psychic pain of rejection, because ambiguity and tentativeness
allows the speaker to disavow strong interpretations by the listener. But
that very ambiguity and tentativeness means that a worker who relies on
such strategy may not be heard by the employer or perceived by the trier
of fact as having raised a workplace issue sufficiently to satisfy the
exhaustion requirement.
iii. Class, Race, Ethnicity, and the Exercise of Voice
A plausible reading of the previous section is that linguistic gender
differences are in significant part a symptom of broader patterns of
inequality. We might, for instance, expect that workers who use the
197. Id. at 282.
198. See, e.g., Janet M. Bing & Victoria L. Bergvall, The Question of Questions: Beyond
Binary Thinking, in LANGUAGE AND GENDER: A READER 495 (Jennifer Coates ed., 1998); Penelope
Eckert & Sally McConnell-Ginet, Communities of Practice: Where Language, Gender, and Power
All Live, in LANGUAGE AND GENDER: A READER 484 (Jennifer Coates ed., 1990).
199. DEBORAH TANNEN, GENDER AND DISCOURSE 31 (1994).
200. Janet Holmes, Women's Talk: The Question of Sociolinguistic Universals, in LANGUAGE
AND GENDER: A READER 461, 466-67 (Jennifer Coates ed., 1998).
201. See, e.g., TANNEN, supra note 199, at 7-11 (responding forcefully to criticism that her
work ignores the role of male dominance, she contends that "consequences of style differences work
to the disadvantage of members of groups that are stigmatized in our society, and to the advantage
of those who have the power to enforce their interpretations.").
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female register will show other differences in their behavior. Separate
research on class and race provides reason to believe that one result of
inequality will be greater reluctance by the less powerful to enter into
negotiations.' °2
In a book documenting her own attempt to survive as a low-wage
worker for a month each in three different states, Barbara Ehrenreich
captures poignantly the ways in which workers in low-wage jobs
internalize the messages of their surroundings.
If you are treated as an untrustworthy person-a potential slacker, drug
addict or thief-you may begin to feel less trustworthy yourself. If you
are constantly reminded of your lowly position in the social hierarchy,
whether by individual managers or by a plethora of impersonal rules,
you begin to accept that unfortunate status.' °3
Ehrenreich's concern is why the wages of low-wage workers rose
so little in the tight labor market of the late 1990s. However, both the
conditions she documents and the results she identifies are relevant to
whether low-wage workers are likely to raise complaints with their
supervisors. Among large employers, "personality" and drug tests are
increasing in popularity as a part of the initial hiring process, 204 while at
the same time unions are explicitly discouraged. Neither circumstance is
likely to encourage independent or non-conforming behavior-like
complaining-on the part of employees. And indeed Ehrenreich's coworkers are eager to please their employers and not inclined to
complain. 5
This disinclination to complain may have deep roots. Individuals
who are exposed to a relatively authoritarian parenting or educational
approach, as may be the case with many working class and minority
children, 206 or to societal discrimination, may learn early that it is
dangerous to question authority. If so, they are unlikely to believe that
raising concerns with their supervisors at work will be fruitful. Some
will become passive and compliant, at least in the presence of those with
power; others may resist or rebel. In either case, when encountering
202. In this section, I have not attempted to canvass the sociological literature on class and
race. I simply seek to identify additional reasons why an expectation that individual workers raise
workplace concerns with their supervisors will predictably disadvantage those most in need of the
support provided by the unemployment insurance system.
203. NICKLE AND DIMED, supra note 148, at 210.
204. See id. at 13-14, 124-25.
205. See id. at 110, 113, 180; cf RICHARD SENNETT & JONATHAN COBB, THE HIDDEN
INJURIES OF CLASS (1972).
206. Cf. JONATHAN KOZOL, DEATH AT AN EARLY AGE: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HEARTS
AND MINDS OF NEGRO CHILDREN IN THE BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967).
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problems with their working conditions, they are not likely to exercise
voice in the systematic fashion contemplated in the exhaustion
requirement.
Our national legacy of racial discrimination likely has similar
effects on the willingness of many racial minorities to exercise voice,
even those not disadvantaged as a matter of class. z 7 We are not far
removed from the days of organized lynching in which young AfricanAmerican men, especially, faced grave risks if they dared to abandon the
passive, compliant, and deferential role demanded of them by their white
"superiors," and often, as a result, by their worried parents.08 This
enforced loss of voice is no longer the official societal norm; but it has
left a legacy of suspicion that often results in silence across the racial
divide. We have no reason to believe that this silence would be less
common in the workplace than elsewhere.
The link between discrimination and lack of voice is not, however,
limited to African-Americans, as is illustrated by the following two
examples. First, the voice of Native Americans was suppressed quite
literally during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Among other
practices imposed by the federal government, children were taken from
their tribes, and sent to boarding schools where they were forbidden to
speak their native tongues. 209 Again, we would expect that devastating
effects of such policies would be echoed in workplace behavior.
Second, in recent years, immigration from Mexico and Central
American countries has led to a large increase in the Spanish-speaking
population in many states. In the wake of this increase we find the
"English-only policies" currently popular among many employers.20
Especially for workers who are not fluently bilingual, such policies can
only discourage the use of voice.
207. See generally FairDriving, supra note 174; FurtherEvidence, supra note 174.
208. See generally Orlando Patterson, RITUALS OF BLOOD: CONSEQUENCES OF SLAVERY IN
TWO AMERICAN CENTURIES (1998); Emma Coleman Jordan, Crossing The River Of Blood Between
Us: Lynching, Violence, Beauty, and the Paradox of Feminist History, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
545 (2000).
209. See Allison M. Dussias, Waging War with Words: Native Americans' Continuing Struggle
Against the Suppression of Their Languages,60 OHIO ST. L.J. 905-08 (1999).
210. To date employment discrimination challenges to these policies under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1965,28 U.S.C. § 2001e-2 (2001), have been largely unsuccessful, typically on
the ground that language discrimination is not a form of discrimination based on national origin.
Rosanna McCalips, Comment, What Recent Court Cases Indicate About English-Only Rules in the
Workplace: A CriticalLook at the Need Fora Supreme Court Ruling on the Issue, 4 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 417 (2002); see generally Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How The Garcia Cousins
Lost Their Accents: Understanding The Language Of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only
Rules As The Product OfRacial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, And Legal Indeterminacy, 10 LA RAZA
L.J. 261, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1347 (1998).
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The reluctance to exercise voice likely extends beyond complaints
about working conditions. Individuals who do not feel safe in their work
environment may also be very reluctant to share personal information
concerning their medical or family problems with their supervisors. I
suspect that this dynamic has been involved in several cases my clinic
has handled involving very articulate, controlled, middle-class black
women. In each case our client was denied benefits, because she failed
to discuss her medical or family problems with her employer. My sense
was that each woman's work identity required that she appear to be fully
"in control," and that to discuss her "personal" problems with the
employer would have shattered that necessary illusion.
To the extent that power continues to be unequally distributed in
our society, we can expect that employees who are female, members of
non-dominant racial or ethnic groups, or working class may be
disparately disadvantaged by a requirement that they exhaust alternatives
to leaving work.
iv.

The Exercise of Voice in a Multi-Cultural Society

A final consideration is that in addition to class, race and ethnicity,
cultural background may independently affect willingness to raise
concerns about working conditions. Anyone who has read Anne
Fadiman's story of conflict between the Western medical interpretation
of epilepsy and the Hmong culture's understanding " ' will be prepared to
believe that workers' willingness to complain to supervisors will vary
significantly across cultures. Empirical research on this variable within
the exit/voice framework is just beginning, however.
The cultural effects thesis was investigated in a recent field study
that compared the effect of low job satisfaction on employee responses,
including exit and voice, in Hong Kong and New Zealand, two countries
that rank toward the extremes in "collectivism" and "individualism,"
respectively.1 2 Although the authors note a variety of limitations on their
results, they found that "culture directly influenced the behavioral
responses of exit or voice" and that "workers in some cultures are more
likely to express their dissatisfaction with their job by voicing their
,,211
concerns to management.

211.

THE SPIRIT CATCHES YOU AND YOU FALL DOWN: A HMONG CHILD, HER AMERICAN

DOCTORS AND THE COLLISION OF Two CULTURES (1997).

212. See David C. Thomas & Kevin Au, The Effect of Cultural Differences on Behavioral
Response to Low Job Satisfaction, 33 J. OF INT'L BUS. STUDIES 309 (2002).
213. Id. at 10, 12.
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3. The Employer's Advantage in Litigating Exhaustion
As the preceding sections have shown, workers have valid reasons
for not taking their concerns over workplace conditions to the employer
(or sharing the details of their medical histories or personal lives). A
further reason exists, however, for either rejecting an exhaustion
requirement entirely, or at least limiting its demands on workers.2 4 A
worker will often be forced to argue that potential alternatives suggested
by the employer would have been futile because they would not have
resolved the problem. Given the informal nature of unemployment
insurance hearings, the employee often has no effective way to counter
the employer's claims.
In order to understand this claim, it is critical to understand the
high-volume, short, and informal nature of the typical unemployment
hearings. In my own state, formal discovery is available only at the
discretion of the administrative law judge who will preside over the
hearing. 251 These judges, taking very seriously the idea that hearings are
to be inexpensive and expeditious so that eligible claimants can receive
their benefits promptly, are reluctant either to grant such discovery, or to
encourage employers to comply with broad subpoenas. Hearings are
typically scheduled for one hour when the parties are unrepresented, and
the judges are under considerable time pressure to finish the current
hearing in order to get on to the next one. Though in-person hearings are
still available, perhaps 85% are now held by telephone.2 6 These are not
conditions that make it easy to respond to information that is in the
control of the employer. Yet conditions in Washington seem to be
exceptionally generous compared to many other states, where all
hearings are now held by telephone, or where hearing length is measured
in minutes, not hours.2 7
214. Many employers will have a generalized advantage in unemployment hearings: the fact
that they are more often "repeat players" means that more of them (1) are represented, either by an
attorney, or more commonly by a company such as Employer's Unity that provides lay
representation for employers and (2) as repeat players they are more knowledgeable about the
process. For a theoretical analysis of the advantages repeat players have in litigation, see generally,
Galanter, supra note 189. The theoretical analysis has been confirmed by later empirical research.
See generally Joel B. Grossman et al., Do the "Haves" Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAw & SOC'Y
REV. 803 (1999).
215.

See WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§

34.05.446 (West 2001); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-04-

130 (2002).
216. See State of Washington Office of Administrative Hearings: About Unemployment
Benefit Hearings, at http://www.wa.gov/oah/ESDHrg.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2003).
217. See, e.g., Rue v. K-Mart Corp., 713 A.2d 82, 86-87 (Pa. 1998) (holding that findings in
unemployment compensation hearings should not have preclusive effect in other proceedings given
the brief and informal nature of unemployment compensation hearings). The court noted that
referees in Pennsylvania issue an average of 1024 decisions per year. See id. at 86 n.3.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

49

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 5

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:459

A few examples taken from cases handled in our clinic may be
helpful in understanding the disparity between employer and worker in
litigating exhaustion issues. A temporary help agency representative
may testify at a hearing that the employee should have called in more
often at the end of an assignment, because "we had lots of jobs available
then." The worker has no way of knowing whether this is true, or
whether any of those jobs were suitable for her, and due to the time
pressures in hearings, many judges will not press for details. Or, the
employer may testify, "Yes, Joe had been seeking relief for a couple
months, but if he had only waited two more weeks, a job in a different
department (shift, etc.) would have opened up. Joe jumped the gun and
failed to exhaust alternatives to quitting." Here, even if the cited job did
open up eventually, the worker is not in a position to know whether it
would have been offered to him or to someone else.
In an informal hearing with no discovery, only the most
sophisticated and well-connected claimant comes to the hearing with
good information about what other job prospects exist within the
company, and even that claimant's information may be entirely hearsay.
In these circumstances, even if the trier of fact demands specifics from
the employer, and the employer provides them, the employee will have
little ability to challenge the claim.
VI. THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICAN WORKPLACE: WHY
WORKERS FOREGO VOICE IN FAVOR OF EXIT
In this section, I suggest that for a significant number of workers in
the American economy of the twenty-first century, the workplace norm
is exit, which is the economist's norm, not voice, the norm of the
political scientist. The changing nature of the American workplace has
been the subject of considerable commentary in recent decades.2 8 While
many issues are disputed, wide agreement can be found on at least the
following points.
First, employment relationships have become both less stable and
less secure. As noted in a careful effort to reconcile conflicting data
(though the media may overemphasize these developments), "the 1990s
have witnessed some changes in the employment relationship consistent
with weakened bonds between workers and firms."2 9 Layoffs by large
218. See David Neumark, Changes in Job Stability and Job Security: A Collective Effort to
Untangle, Reconcile, and Interpret the Evidence, in ON THE JOB: IS LONG-TERM EMPLOYMENT A
THING OF THE PAST? I (David Neumark ed., 2000).
219. Id. at23.
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corporations have become normal, extending to white collar and
managerial workers who formerly considered themselves exempt from
the vicissitudes of the economy and expected to work with the same
employer until retirement. 220 Thus, many argue that loyalty by companies
to their workers is very much the exception. 221 In addition, "[d]uring the
1980s, the temporary help services industry increased in size by at least
100 percent. 2 22 That industry epitomizes short-term relationships with
no expectation of loyalty.223 The citizenship model, in which workers
should feel loyalty toward the organization and therefore exercise voice
before leaving, fits poorly in such an environment. 224 A consumer model
premised on exit seems more apt in the current environment, especially
for low-wage jobs in which employers and employees are relatively
fu
.,221
fungible.
Second, the unionized workplace has reached its low point since the
adoption of the Wagner Act, with less than one-seventh of workers
belonging to a union. 26 Even in unionized workplaces, the power of
unions, and workers' identification with them, has arguably decreased
significantly. To the extent that workers are more likely to exercise voice
if they feel more powerful vis-A-vis the employer, the decline of unions
makes a requirement to exercise voice unrealistic.
Third, despite management advice that favors such trends as
devolving responsibility to lower levels, and reliance on "work groups,"
we have not yet developed alternatives to unions, such as the European
works councils, that provide a realistic avenue for the expression of
voice by employees. 27
Commentators disagree about the desirability of these trends. While
many worry about an exacerbation of the trend toward a world of
"haves" and "have-nots" among the employed, 28 others celebrate a shift
towards a "Silicon Valley" style world of independent contractors
220. See HECKSCHER, supra note 118, at 3-4.
221. See id. at 8.
222. Alec R. Levenson, Long-Run Trends in Part-Time and Temporary Employment: Toward
an Understanding, in ON THE JOB: Is LONG-TERM EMPLOYMENT A THING OF THE PAST? 335

(David Neumark ed., 2000).
223. The exception is when it epitomizes long-term relationships with no expectation of loyalty
or fringe benefits. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1997)
(establishing an integrated workforce "over a continuous period, often exceeding two years").
224. See supra text accompanying notes 112-18.
225. See id.
226. See supra text accompanying note 156.
227. See generally European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions, at http://www.eurofound.ie/ewc/index.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2003).
228. See generally Vicki Schultz, Essay: Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000).
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229
moving from one project to the next, always learning new skills.
Whether good or bad, I argue that these trends add up to a world of work
for which a model of economics and the consumer, is more on point than
a model of politics and citizenship. In such a world, workers will
understandably choose the exit model of economics rather than the
political model of voice. Lacking stable relationships and any sense of
loyalty by the employer, absent the support that a union can provide for
expressing grievances, the "reasonable person's" response to problems
with his or her "work connected factors" will be to quit and look for
another job. I would prefer a world in which work is structured in such a
way that a model of citizenship makes more sense than a model of the
consumer. To apply such a model under present conditions, however, is
to live in a fantasy world, and inappropriately disadvantages employees.

VII.

IMPLICATIONS

I began this Article began by considering a small and nitty-gritty
provision of the unemployment insurance system, the exhaustion
requirement in voluntary quit cases, and then looking at the assumptions
underlying that requirement. Before challenging those assumptions
based on the practical realities of how the exhaustion requirement plays
out in practice, I provided a theoretical framework for thinking about the
exhaustion requirement and linked that theoretical framework to the
current evolution of our labor market. In this part, I turn my attention
back to the voluntary quit exhaustion requirement and consider the
implications of the exit, voice, and loyalty framework and developments
in the labor market for the exhaustion requirement in the unemployment
insurance system2
229. See Levenson, supra note 222, at 335.
230. In this Article I do not attempt to address systematically the implications of my analysis
outside the unemployment compensation system. I do note, however, that an analogous requirement
can be found in the law of sexual harassment, and the requirement suffers from similar defects.
First, in order to make out a harassment case under Title VII, a claimant must show that the
harasser's attentions were "unwelcome." Especially where the harasser has supervisory authority
over the victim, the victim may be reluctant to respond in a firm way-to exercise voice-for many
of the reasons discussed in this Article. Indeed, considerable empirical evidence concerning
responses to sexual harassment suggests that women commonly attempt to deal with harassment by
ignoring it, brushing it off, or using other indirect approaches. In her recent essay discussing the
empirical research, Employer Liability For Sexual Harassment-Normative, Descriptive, and
Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply to ProfessorsBeiner and Bisom-Rapp, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 169, 181 n.48 (2001), Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger cites, for example, Caroline C.
Cochran et al., Predictorsof Responses to Unwanted Sexual Attention, 21 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q.
207, 217 (1997) (observing that ignoring harassing behavior was the most common response,
elicited in 60% of surveyed employees at a large Midwestem university). See also David E. Terpstra
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In light of the practical realities I have described above, which are
compounded by contemporary changes in the economy that have
undermined the employer loyalty to workers that formerly existed in
some segments of the economy, I reach three conclusions about the
exhaustion requirement. First, I contend that the exhaustion requirement
for voluntary quit cases involving complaints about working conditions
has no legitimate place in the American unemployment compensation
system. Legislatures, courts, and agencies faced with the choice whether
or not to impose an exhaustion requirement, should forego the
opportunity. In addition, they should repeal existing requirements
wherever possible. Furthermore, the courts should adopt the per se goodcause rule that dispenses with the exhaustion requirement where the
employer's violation of labor standards contributes to the decision to
leave.23' I reach this conclusion with some hesitation because I suspect
that the result of abolishing the exhaustion requirement would be that
many cases that are now denied on the basis of failure to exhaust would
simply be denied on the ground that the individual lacked good cause for
quitting. Nonetheless, it seems to me that the exhaustion requirement

& Douglas D. Baker, A Framework for the Study of Sexual Harassment, 7 BASIC & APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 17, 26 (1986) (noting that 61% of United States Merit Systems Protection Board Study
participants' responses included "ignored/did nothing"). Second, under BurlingtonIndustries, Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998), the employer can prevent liability for supervisor harassment by
adopting a policy against sexual harassment, establishing a grievance mechanism for complaints of
sexual harassment, and showing that the plaintiff failed to take advantage of the policy. In effect, the
Supreme Court has adopted an "exhaustion requirement" for Title VII sexual harassment claims. In
their recent survey of almost 650 district and appellate court opinions in sexual harassment cases
between 1986 and 1995, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 548-49
(2001), Professors Ann Juliano and Stewart J. Schwab demonstrate that an implicit exhaustion
requirement has been in place for some time, as successful cases have generally satisfied these
criteria. Yet, workers may be reluctant to exercise voice, for the reasons set out in the preceding
analysis: workers are justly risk-averse and fear firing or retaliation. According to the empirical
studies, only 5% to 15% of victims of sexual harassment resort to formal complaint mechanisms,
with the decision to use such mechanisms significantly correlated with the belief that they will be
effective. As Professor Krieger notes, "[i]ndeed, according to one recent review of the relevant
literature, the reporting of sexual harassment through an employer's official, internal complaint
process is among the least frequently utilized of all defined responsive strategies, with studies
reporting a range of between two percent at the low end and fifteen percent on the high end."
Krieger, supra, at 181. As I have demonstrated in the unemployment context, the decision to avoid
formal complaint mechanisms is not an unreasonable or irrational one. The power dynamics of the
workplace typically favor the employer so that workers are reluctant to exercise voice. Even if
management is not actively hostile in the face of a harassment claim, a tepid, or even seemingly
even-handed response may provide space for co-workers to undermine the complaining worker's
position at work. Where the cooperation of co-workers is required for a worker to satisfactorily
perform his or her own work, the result may be to leave the worker open to discipline or firing for
unsatisfactory work performance.
231. See Martini v. State, 990 P.2d 981, 985 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
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causes enough problems for employees at the administrative hearing
level in cases where good cause seems strong, that abolishing the
requirement makes sense. One of my major concerns is to craft an
approach that is workable at the administrative agency level in the vast
bulk of cases that never reach an administrative law judge, much less a
higher-level court. Thus, I would prefer to abolish the requirement rather
than adopt a burden-shifting regime,"' or a regime that obliges
employers to provide notice of exhaustion
233 requirements as a condition
precedent to the exhaustion requirement.
Second, on the "street level," administrative agency decision
makers 234 who are applying already existing exhaustion requirements
should be mindful of the practical realities facing workers when they
decide whether to quit. Workers face very real risks in raising their
concerns about work, as well as difficult obstacles, including power
differentials and lack of' skill and training for effective negotiation.
Given these realities, in considering what a reasonable person would do,
agency decision makers should focus on how people in fact behave, not
on how skilled attorneys in the same position might behave. Thus, a
worker should not be expected to go over her boss's head, or to identify
and contact government agencies that might have regulatory authority
over a problem. I would argue that a worker should be expected to
contact his union only if the union is strong enough to have a visible
presence at the place of employment; for example, where no shop
steward or other union representative is visible at the workplace, filing a
grievance should not be expected.
Third, in medical quit cases, the expectation that the employee
should provide the employer with medical evidence concerning the
problem before they quit should not apply to individuals who lack the
medical insurance that would give them ready access to such evidence.

232. See supra text accompanying notes 104-08 (discussing burden shifting, which seems to
me an appropriate response so long as an exhaustion requirement remains in place).
233. At a faculty colloquium on an earlier version of this Article, my colleagues suggested
procedural devices of this sort, as a solution to the concerns I discussed. Thanks to Steve Calandrillo
for drawing my attention to Conley v. Pitney Bowes, 34 F.3d 714 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that, in an
ERISA case, the employer's obligation to provide notice to employee of administrative exhaustion
requirement is condition precedent to allowing the employer to raise a lack of exhaustion as
defense).
234. Here I mean to include both agency staffers and triers of fact at the administrative
hearing level.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article tells the story of a "stealth" doctrinal trend. The
movement toward adopting a requirement that claimants for
unemployment insurance benefits exhaust alternatives to quitting has
been quiet, gradual, and essentially unnoticed, both in the specialized
universe of unemployment insurance benefits, and in the larger
intertwined worlds of law and politics. The story is an important one,
however, for three reasons. First, exhaustion requirements prevent real
people, whether resisting abusive working conditions, or simply down
on their luck, from getting benefits that could help them through
troubled times. Second, the trend toward adopting exhaustion
requirements reflects broader shifts both in the explicitly political
legislative environment in which unemployment insurance statutes are
amended, and the less visible political environments in which agency
rules are adopted and appellate cases decided. Thus, it can serve as a
symbol for the changing legal framework governing our unemployment
insurance programs. Amid a shifting political climate, such small
changes have cumulatively helped create an unemployment system that
is decreasingly able to fulfill its original purposes. Finally, these political
changes are accompanied by radical changes in our economy. Both
corporate loyalty and union power are on the decline, placing in question
many of the assumptions underlying our employment laws.
In addition, however, this Article tells a different story, the story of
how the doctrinal trend is applied on the street level. This second story
reminds us once again of the power wielded by lower-level decision
makers in high-volume administrative agency tribunals. These decision
makers' understanding of how "reasonable people" behave gives content
and significance to the doctrinal shift. This street-level story highlights
the gap between the exit strategy relied on by many workers, and the
voice alternative considered reasonable by many decision makers. We
are thereby reminded once again of the importance of narrowing the gulf
between theory and practice, between the dominant understanding of
how reasonable people behave and the lives of those who come before
the law.
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